The House and Senate Armed Services Committees are nearing completion
of bills authorizing approximately $380 billion in defense spending
for FY 2004. Among the contested provisions of this legislation is language
on low-yield nuclear weapons' research and the future testing of nuclear
weapons. The American Physical Society, one of the American Institute
of Physics' ten Member Societies, recently reaffirmed a Statement on
Nuclear Testing warning of "serious negative international consequences"
from such testing, finding that it "is not required to retain confidence
in the safety and reliability of the remaining nuclear weapons in the
United States' stockpile."
Earlier this week, the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces considered
draft provisions of H.R. 1588, The National Defense Authorization Act
for FY 2004. Section 221 of this bill rescinds the prohibition on research
and development of low-yield nuclear weapons (with yields of five kilotons
or less.) During the subcommittee's deliberations, an amendment offered
by Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) to restrict how the requested $6 million
for the "Advanced Concepts Initiative" could be spent failed
by a single vote along party lines.
While the House is expected to approve the provision on low-yield nuclear
weapons' research as a part of the much larger authorization bill, the
Senate floor action scheduled for next month is not as predictable.
There has been much discussion about the need for this new type of weapon
both on and off the Hill. At an arms control press conference last week,
Sidney Drell, Deputy Director Emeritus of Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center, acknowledged the need to respond to the threats posed by deep
bunkers for weapons storage or command and control centers. But he disputed
the contention that only nuclear weapons are suitable against such bunkers,
calling it a "dangerous thought" that nuclear weapons be contemplated
for use for what has been accomplished with conventional weapons. Supporters
of research on these weapons contend that radiation would be needed
to kill biological agents stored in underground bunkers. At a hearing
of the Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces last month, chairman
Wayne Allard (R-CO) said "it's time to begin considering how advanced
nuclear concepts may contribute to our ability to hold at risk emerging
threats." He noted that the authorization would be only for research
and not for advanced development or weapons production. Similar contending
sentiments were expressed at the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee
hearing in March. Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) argued that the proposed research
"opens a Pandora's box of strategic considerations." Everet
Beckner, Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) outlined his support for the research, acknowledging that he
was not viewing the political ramifications of the weapons research,
but was rather recommending it as an engineer or scientist.
Congress is also considering whether current constraints on underground
testing should be changed. The House subcommittee considered this issue
during its Wednesday markup. The subcommittee defeated, on a party line
vote, an amendment offered by Spratt and Tauscher to make the observed
testing moratorium official U.S. policy. The amendment would have required
the President to notify Congress at least 18 months before any test
and explain why it was necessary. The Administration wants to reduce
the time that is necessary to conduct such a test from the current three
years to perhaps as little as six months. An NNSA report outlining the
factors involved in reducing this time, as well as a recommendation
for what time period is appropriate, has been delayed. The report was
required by a previous authorization act, and the subcommittee accepted
an amendment that constrains the use of funding for enhanced test readiness
until the report is received. This amendment was offered by the subcommittee's
ranking member, Silvestre Reyes (D-TX). In his remarks, subcommittee
chairman Terry Everett (R-AL) called the current three year test preparation
requirement "unacceptable." Spratt's opening statement explained
that "to the extent we compress the period for test readiness,
we may be actually encroaching upon talent needed to have a robust Stockpile
Stewardship Program. . . . we need to very carefully weigh that trade
off."
Note that in early April, the American Physical Society issued the
following statement:
"03.2 Statement on Nuclear Testing (Adopted by Council
on April 4, 2003)
"The American Physical Society, reaffirms its April
1997 statement that 'fully informed technical studies have concluded
continued testing is not required to retain confidence in the safety
and reliability of the remaining nuclear weapons in the United States'
stockpile.' Resumption of nuclear testing may have serious negative
international consequences, particularly on the nonproliferation regime.
In addition the Society strongly urges the Congress and the Administration
to provide sufficient notification and justification for any proposed
nuclear test to allow adequate time for informed and thorough analysis
and public discussion."
Enlarge text
Shrink text
Print
E-mail
Digg this
Del.icio.us
Furl