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The AIP Governing Board approved the following statement at its fall 1999 meeting:

The AIP Governing Board deems its imperative that the nuclear-capable nations of the world reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The Governing Board endorses the American Geophysical Union Position Statement on "Capability to Monitor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty" and the American Physical Society "Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

The American Geophysical Union Statement follows:

Capability to Monitor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Adopted by AGU Council September, 1999

In September 1996, the United States was the first of 152 nations to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an international agreement to ban all nuclear test explosions. The treaty is intended to impede the development of nuclear weapons as part of the international nonproliferation regime. The treaty has not yet been ratified by the U.S. As a result, many of its verification provisions have not yet been fully implemented. When implemented, the American Geophysical Union (AGU) and the Seismological Society of America (SSA) are confident that the combined worldwide monitoring resources will meet the verification goals of the CTBT.

The CTBT will be monitored by: 1) the national intelligence means of various countries, 2) the International Monitoring System (IMS) negotiated under the CTBT that consists of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound networks, along with on-site inspections, and 3) the efforts of numerous independent scientists and institutions worldwide. It is this combination of resources that gives confidence in the ability to uncover CTBT violations. AGU and SSA believe that this overall monitoring capability will continue to strengthen as more data are collected, more research is performed, and as global communication networks expand.

The seismic component of the International Monitoring System is to consist of 170 seismic stations. This network is expected to detect all seismic events of about magnitude 4 or larger and locate those events within 1000 square kilometers (a circle with a diameter of approximately 35 km). This is the maximum area permitted by the treaty for an on-site inspection. A seismic magnitude of 4 corresponds to an explosive yield of approximately 1 kiloton (the explosive yield of 1,000 tons of TNT). AGU and SSA believe that the verification system, if built as planned, can be relied upon to meet that goal.

One of the biggest challenges to monitoring the CTBT is the possibility that testing could be successfully hidden by conducting nuclear explosions in an evasive manner. The concern is partly based on U.S. and Russian experiments which have demonstrated that seismic signals can be muffled, or decoupled, for a nuclear explosion detonated in a large underground cavity. The decoupling scenario, however, as well as other evasion scenarios, demand extraordinary technical expertise and the likelihood of detection is high. AGU and SSA believe that such technical scenarios are credible only for nations with extensive practical testing experience and only for yields of at most a few kilotons. Furthermore, no nation could rely upon successfully concealing a program of nuclear testing, even at low yields.

Data from the treaty's monitoring system will also contribute to our scientific understanding of the Earth and efforts to mitigate earthquake hazards. Article IV.A.10 of the treaty states "The provisions of this treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange of data for scientific purposes". AGU and SSA support a broad interpretation of this article and strongly urge that all data from the International Monitoring System be made openly available without any restriction or delay.

The American Physical Society statement follows:
Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Adopted by the APS Council, 19 April 1997

On September 10, 1996 the United Nations overwhelmingly approved the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a treaty ending all nuclear testing, of any yield, at any location, for all time. The United States, all other declared nuclear weapon states, and a growing majority of the world's nations have now signed that treaty. Although the date at which the CTBT will enter into force is not yet certain, the treaty is of extraordinary importance to the United States and to the future of all humankind.

The CTBT, the culmination of over 40 years of effort, ends the qualitative arms race among the nuclear states and is central to future efforts to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. The promise to negotiate and put into force a CTBT was an essential pre-condition to achieving an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. Ratification of the CTBT will mark an important advance in uniting the world in an effort to contain and reduce the nuclear danger.

Having been the first country to develop nuclear weapons, having been a major participant in the nuclear arms race of the Cold War, and having played a leadership role in the NPT extension and the CTBT negotiations, it is appropriate and imperative that the United States ratify the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date. The Council notes that detailed, fully informed technical studies have concluded continued nuclear testing is not required to retain confidence in the safety and reliability of the remaining nuclear weapons in the United States' stockpile, provided science and technology programs necessary for stockpile stewardship are maintained. This conclusion is also supported by both the senior civilian and military officials responsible for US national security.

The Council of the American Physical Society, representing 40,000 academic, industrial, and laboratory physicists, endorses the CTBT, including its extensive technical and procedural provisions to verify compliance with treaty requirements.