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Oral History Transcript — Henry Kendall

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Interview with Henry Kendall
by Finn Aaserud at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
November 25 and 26, 1986

Transcript

Dr. Aaserud:

We are in Henry Kendall's office at MIT, on the 25th of November 1986. We should start briefly with your family background, youth and schooling. We can go quickly through that, and then deal very briefly with your early career and research to get the main dates. Then we'll turn in more detail to your science policy interests, including where those relate to your physics career. We'll start with your science policy involvement, especially in JASON, and then turn to the Union of Concerned Scientists when that comes up. You're welcome to add any topic that you find of relevance to the general set of questions. Let me start by asking where and when you were born.

Dr. Kendall:

Well, I was born in Boston on the 9th of December 1926.

Aaserud:

Your parents' background, what was that?

Kendall:

My father was a New Englander. He was born in Charlestown, Massachusetts, in 1878, and was a businessman in Boston. My mother was Canadian, and became a naturalized American citizen quite late in life.

Aaserud:

After being married to your father?

Kendall:

Yes, many years later.

Aaserud:

But your father's family goes back for a long while in New England.

Kendall:

Yes. Father's family lived in New England basically since they came from Europe a good many years ago.

Aaserud:

What was their education?

Kendall:

Father was a graduate of Amherst College, and then went into business. Mother was not a college graduate. My own education was also at Amherst College (major in mathematics, and a sort of smaller subemphasis on physics. Then I graduated in 1950, and came to MIT to graduate school, where I worked in atomic and nuclear physics. I finished my Ph.D. work in September of 1954, although the degree record indicates 1955. I held off and went to the June 1955 commencement, but in September of 1954 I was awarded the first of two National Science Foundation post-doctoral fellowships, which I used here at MIT and at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Aaserud:

Do you have any sisters or brothers?

Kendall:

Yes, I have one younger brother who is a businessman and one sister.

Aaserud:

You were the only one who got into physics?

Kendall:

Yes, I am with one single exception, a much older man named Edwin Adams who was a cousin of my father's and in fact his age. He's long since passed away, but he was at one point chairman of the Princeton physics department. He was a classical mathematical physicist.

Aaserud:

While we're on family, I have decided to ask whether there is any relationship with the Kendall, in Kendall Square.

Kendall:

Not so far as I know. Father at one point did some research to see to whom we were related, and it turns out we're not related to any other Kendalls in the United States so far as we know. So we're not related to Kendall Square, or other Kendalls.

Aaserud:

So there are quite a few Kendalls.

Kendall:

Oh, I wouldn't say there are quite a few. There are probably six or eight in the Boston Telephone Book, out of 700,000 names.

Aaserud:

What was it that guided you toward physics?

Kendall:

Well, I really don't know the answer to that. I was apparently interested in technical things as a very young child, and just grew into it, always being interested in physics and chemistry and those sorts of things, so I have no origin which is particularly identifiable by me. It's simply a lifelong interest.

Aaserud:

No teacher, or family member was particularly influential.

Kendall:

No, it wasn't either teaching or family that got my interest up. It much antedated any formal education in science or anything.

Aaserud:

Once the interest was there, was it supported by the family?

Kendall:

Yes. My father was quite supportive of it.

Aaserud:

You were born in Boston?

Kendall:

Yes, that's correct.

Aaserud:

You went to high school here?

Kendall:

Well, I didn't go to high school, I went to a preparatory school for a few years in Deadham, a school called Noble & Greenough and then, before finishing there, I left and went to Deerfield Academy in the fall of 1941, the year of Pearl Harbor; I graduated from there in 1945. Then I entered the Navy as an inactive reservist and went to the Merchant Marine Academy in 1945. I was there when the war ended in the Pacific, and I continued on for another year and a quarter into the fall of 1946. When I had enough time to be free of the draft, I resigned and went to Amherst, coming into the freshman year a little late that fall, of 1946.

Aaserud:

What specifically did you do in the draft?

Kendall:

In the Merchant Marine Academy. I was not drafted because I was in what was then regarded as a service academy. It was the Merchant Marine equivalent of West Point or Annapolis, and was run by the Navy during the war to prepare people for service in the Merchant Marine. But that was not anything I had any interest in pursuing as a career, and as soon as I was able to leave, I left.

Aaserud:

Even if you can't point to any specific influences towards science, were there any teachers in school that had some impact on your direction?

Kendall:

Well, I remember one teacher at Noble & Greenough who was, I think, quite gifted and out of the ordinary at that level of science. He was fairly interesting, but not particularly interested in teaching, as I recall, so I never found it as fruitful as it might have been. I think I did not flourish too well in the academic environment, at least in science. The courses were really not adapted to somebody who was really extremely interested in the subject.

Aaserud:

But somehow or other the interest had to get some expression; there must have been some correlation between what you wanted and what opportunities there were.

Kendall:

Well, I was interested, and that's the best I can say. When I got to college, I was able to take formal course`s in mathematics and chemistry and some in physics, although I did not major in physics. That was my first really useful formal education in the sciences. Beyond that, I was just a home tinkerer, which I think is quite common among physicists, particularly experimental physicists.

Aaserud:

That was Amherst.

Kendall:

That was at Amherst, yes.

Aaserud:

Was there any teacher there that you would point to? Any fellow students?

Kendall:

No, I don't think so there, either. The physics department was really fairly weak. I was interested primarily in physics, but I majored in mathematics simply because I did not wish to take the routine courses in physics which were really boring, tedious and not very stimulating, so I sidestepped most of them. I did an honors thesis in the physics department, but beyond that I was a mathematics major.

Aaserud:

The choice of college, did that come naturally?

Kendall:

Well, many people in the family had been to Amherst, including my father. It seemed quite a reasonable place to go, and I was very happy to go there.

Aaserud:

The source of support when going there; was that from the family?

Kendall:

Yes, that was from the family.

Aaserud:

Were you actually more interested in mathematics then?

Kendall:

No, I was not.

Aaserud:

You were not, so already then you were thinking of going into physics?

Kendall:

Yes, I was clearly going into physics.

Aaserud:

So you'd made a career choice already.

Kendall:

Yes, very early; oh yes, it was quite clear. I had the opportunity to get sort of continuing advice on a career, even as a young child, from Karl Compton, who was then president of MIT. He was a close friend of my father's, and they were among a handful of people who owned a fishing camp together. Father would spend a couple of weeks in the spring every year with Compton and other people, and I would see him off and on. I was able to get advice as to how to proceed, so I didn't have any problems about what school to go to. It was probably that that led me to end up at MIT in graduate school. I only applied to one graduate school when I left college.

Aaserud:

You have stayed rather close to home for most of your career.

Kendall:

More or less at MIT, right, although I spent 5 years at Stanford after my NSF fellowship ran out.

Aaserud:

Could you describe any particular lures of physics at the time? Why was it that physics was a big thing? Can that be put in words?

Kendall:

Well, I'm not really sure, except that I was able to deal reasonably well with equipment. It was a discipline very much in the headlines as I was moving from grade school and high school level work into college. It was physics that permeated the war effort, in many many different aspects. I think probably a good part was simply the advice of Karl Compton.

Aaserud:

Was that a well defined group around Compton? Did it circle around that cottage or was it part of an academic group within Cambridge? Were your father and Compton part of a small group of a more general environment?

Kendall:

Well, no. It just turned out that my father and Compton were friends. Father lived in Boston, he had many friends here, and Karl Compton was among them.

Aaserud:

Did you find that he was eager to attract you?

Kendall:

Yes, he seemed to be. He was always very helpful.

Aaserud:

What kind of physics did you have in mind (experimental, theoretical, did you want to teach?

Kendall:

No, I was basically never a potential theoretical physicist. I simply was attracted to basic research and teaching and the university environment, so I drifted into that without any great internal struggles.

Aaserud:

But you wanted to do research.

Kendall:

Yes.

Aaserud:

And your family continued to be supportive of that.

Kendall:

Yes, very much.

Aaserud:

You graduated from Amherst in 1950.

Kendall:

Yes, in the spring of 1950.

Aaserud:

And then you went to MIT immediately after.

Kendall:

Yes, that's correct, I went that fall. I was in graduate school almost four calendar years to the day.

Aaserud:

Is there anything specific you would say about your graduate training?

Kendall:

Well, I don't think it was any more than a standard graduate school curriculum. I enjoyed it enormously because it was the first contact I had had with high quality people, and I found it a great deal of pleasure.

Aaserud:

You went into MIT without considering other choices.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

Why was that? Was that also Compton to some extent?

Kendall:

Yes, I think so, yes.

Aaserud:

Any particular faculty members that you had a lot of interaction with, or fellow students?

Kendall:

Well, as soon as I was prepared I did a special research problem. I tried theoretical physics briefly, as many graduate students do, but I knew even before I tried it that it would not be successful. But I worked for a semester with Lazslo Tisza on a problem in irreversible thermodynamics, but that confirmed my opinion of my skills in that area. Then I went to work with Martin Deutsch who was an experimentalist here (he still is, in fact (and did a special problem with him on positron annihilation in flight. I continued on with him and did a thesis. I can't remember now how long the special problem took, but it was probably a year. I did a thesis on positronium; an attempt to measure the Lamb shift. That also took a calendar year. Everything seemed to take a year or integral multiples of a year.

Aaserud:

What was the relationship between following courses and doing independent research?

Kendall:

Well, the normal graduate school curriculum is to take courses initially and then taper off as one works into a special problem. I followed more or less that sequence. I recall spending all my summers here taking a variety of courses in physics and EE. I did some teaching in my later summers in graduate school, and I took many courses that were sort of not required for anything in particular. I'd have to look at the record, but I took a number of courses in the electrical engineering department in mathematics of circuit theory and things of that sort.

Aaserud:

You continued to be supported by your family during the first years?

Kendall:

Of graduate school, that's correct.

Aaserud:

Are there other teachers other than Deutsch that you would single out as being important?

Kendall:

Well, there were people who taught courses that I very much enjoyed. Philip Morse did, Herman Feshbach did; methods of mathematical physics and partial differential equations was a much more important part of physics then than it is now, and I took those courses taught by them and enjoyed them. I took a number of courses in thermodynamics, low temperature physics and things of that sort that I also enjoyed.

Aaserud:

But it was more enjoying it as a good course than having a close personal relationship with the teacher.

Kendall:

Yes, that tended not to happen at the graduate school level, not in formal courses.

Aaserud:

How big were the classes?

Kendall:

Well, they varied in size from 30 or 40 people to 12 or 15, as I recall (as they still do, in fact; that's still the same range of sizes.

Aaserud:

Was the Ph.D. your first research project?

Kendall:

No, not the Ph.D.. The first research that I had done was the special problem in positron annihilation, and that was not a thesis subject. As a matter of fact, in the summer of 1943 I worked for the Brown Paper Co. in northern New Hampshire, in their research division, but I did not do serious research. It was, you know, at high school level, but I did see something of industrial research at that time. But the first research that I actually carried out of any sort, which resulted in the first paper that I had my name on, was the one on positron annihilation, about 1953.

Aaserud:

That did not develop into your thesis?

Kendall:

No.

Aaserud:

It was entirely separate.

Kendall:

Yes.

Aaserud:

Was that kind of extra Ph.D. research encouraged?

Kendall:

Well, I think many students normally will do a special problem before they do a Ph.D. thesis subject. That's quite standard. It's quite appropriate, you know, to start in with a smaller special problem.

Aaserud:

Did you travel any during these early years before you took your Ph.D. (travel for research? Did you go to any other place?

Kendall:

Well, no. I was not doing research when I was in college, obviously, and by the time I was in graduate school, I simply stayed in graduate school right through 12 months and took summer courses. By the time I started research, I worked on that through the summers also. No, I did not travel. The first traveling that I did was when I had a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellowship. Then I spent a good deal of time at Brookhaven.

Aaserud:

But that was after.

Kendall:

That was post-Ph.D..

Aaserud:

What was the relationship between your first research project and your Ph.D., if any?

Kendall:

Well, just that they were in the area of positron physics. Martin Deutsch had just a few years before discovered positronium, and had also had a former student work on positron annihilation in flight which was my special problem. The student had not done it correctly, it turns out, and Martin had left the project hanging, unpublished. I came along, and he simply asked me to do it again. It turned out that we were able to identify the mistakes in the earlier work. We published that, and then I went on to do a thesis. It turned out to be a quite difficult problem, which actually has not yet been solved by the approach that we took; it was not really solved until 20 years later, and then by quite different methods. It was an attempt to measure the Lamb shift in the first excited states of positronium, and it was very difficult. I made enough of an advance in it to be able to get a thesis out of it, although we did not succeed in actually measuring the Lamb shift. As I say, that was not done for another 20 years or so, and then by quite a different solid state technique.

Aaserud:

It was essentially a thesis discussing the problems involved?

Kendall:

Oh, I made some inroads on the technology, and succeeded in inducing and identifying the first excited state in positronium, which had not been done before; the project was not empty. But measuring the Lamb shift was way beyond anything that the technology would let anyone do at that time. That was clear in retrospect. It was not clear in foresight when we started.

Aaserud:

Did that work involve a relationship with other students?

Kendall:

No, I did that myself. I did it totally myself, in fact, because shortly after the thesis subject was agreed on, Martin Deutsch went to Europe for a year on sabbatical leave, and we had no communication in that time. When he came back I presented him with a written thesis, so I basically worked totally alone, really without a thesis advisor either.

Aaserud:

There was not even a substitute teacher? Kendall; Well, Jerrold Zacharias was identified as thesis advisor pro tem, but he had no interaction with the experiment, never came and visited, and didn't know what was going on. Basically, I had no scientific or technical help on that project.

Aaserud:

Certainly today experimental physics is very much a collaborative process.

Kendall:

Oh, I understand. I'm deep in collaboration.

Aaserud:

But it wasn't like that; that wasn't your earliest experience.

Kendall:

No, it was not. And I did not shift into high-energy physics until I had reached the end of the postdoctoral fellowship. The postdoctoral fellowship was spent on nuclear physics. I spent a little time doing some more work on positronium, and then at Brookhaven joined Maurice Goldhaber's group and did some work on angular correlations in nuclear decay schemes.

Aaserud:

So are there any fellow students you would mention in terms of their subsequent careers?

Kendall:

Well, one of the students that I met was from Montreal, named Kurt Gottfried. We became friends and roomed together as graduate students for a couple of years, as I recall, and then for another year or two afterward shared an apartment in Cambridge. He became a junior fellow in the Society of Fellows. He's a theoretical physicist who was working with Professor Weisskopf at the time. Later in the 1960s, having been in a variety of places, he was at Cornell. Then, in the late sixties he visited MIT for a year. He was one of the people who helped found the Union of Concerned Scientists. We've had a close collaboration on many things over the years, so he's remained a close friend.

Aaserud:

Did you have the same kind of common interests at that early time?

Kendall:

Insofar as an experimentalist and a theorist can have common interests, yes, I think so.

Aaserud:

I was thinking of more general science policy questions.

Kendall:

No.

Aaserud:

If I read the American Men and Women of Science correctly, your only longstanding experience outside of MIT was at Stanford's High Energy Laboratory.

Kendall:

Well, if we're talking about jobs elsewhere, that's correct. I was out there for five years.

Aaserud:

From 1956 to 1961.

Kendall:

That's correct, through 1961. I went on as a research associate in the High Energy Laboratory in Robert Hofstadter's group, doing high-energy electron scattering. That was when I switched into high-energy physics. But I was there, I think, no more than a year or so. I was asked to go on the teaching staff of the physics department, and I went on as a lecturer and then eventually was made an assistant professor. I think when I left I was an assistant professor.

Aaserud:

That's what it says.

Kendall:

Then I came back to MIT. But I had been involved in important collaborations in high-energy physics outside of MIT.

I spent roughly a third of my time at Stanford, in the period between 1965 and 1973 (somewhere in that period (because we were involved in a very large collaboration at Stanford. I took a sabbatical year out there, and was relieved of a great deal of my teaching duties in the whole period, spending a great deal of time at Stanford. So most of my research has in fact been done off the MIT campus.

Aaserud:

Mostly at Stanford?

Kendall:

No, not mostly at Stanford. A lot of it was at Stanford, but we have had a program of research at Fermi Lab since 1971 or 1972, that is still going on. We will be running again in what is our second big program out there on neutrino scattering. That's coming to an end probably within a year or two, but currently that experiment is still going on. So I have had a lot of traveling to work at Fermi Lab and at Stanford.

Aaserud:

And you started out mentioning Brookhaven, even earlier.

Kendall:

That was earlier, yes. After I got out of graduate school, I had a postdoctoral fellowship 1954-55 and then 1955-56, and that was taken in part at Brookhaven.

Aaserud:

Maybe before we go on to specific things, you could briefly describe your main concerns in research over the years.

Kendall:

Well, I switched out of nuclear physics and atomic physics because it was becoming of less and less interest in the middle fifties. I think the fundamental problems had in some measure been solved, and I found high-energy physics potentially more attractive.

Joining Hofstadter's group meant a commitment to electron physics as opposed to strong interaction physics. So, I became interested in electron scattering, which was the central theme of Hofstadter's research, and stayed with it, in fact, through the years at Stanford with Jerome Friedman, whom I met at Stanford. He had come from Chicago, and we collaborated together at Stanford when I was on the faculty and staff there. Then, later, we both came back to MIT and continued our collaboration. We were the co-leaders of a research group at MIT, as soon as we were together here in 1961. We had a research program on the electron synchrotron at CEA, the Cambridge Electron Accelerator. We did a number of experiments there in electrodynamics on muon pair production; I'm trying to think of some of the others. In 1962, I spend the summer at Orsay at the high-energy linear electronic accelerator doing nuclear physics studies with electron beams.

And then around 1964 or 1965, we asked to join a project which was just beginning and which was then known as Project M. It later became known as SLAC, the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. We asked to join and were accepted as members of Group A. That was a program with which, as I said, I spent a lot of time on at Stanford. It involved the then-largest electron accelerator, and our work was totally devoted to electron scattering from the nucleon (from the proton and neutron. So that was the research interest up to that time. This was an extremely successful program: we established that these were point-like, massive constituents in the nucleon, now identified as quarks.

In 1970 that program was beginning to pinch out. The group here was a little larger by the early seventies, and we started a collaboration at Fermi Lab, doing small angle scattering of hadrons with a small angle very high energy spectrometer, and worked on that for about eight years. Around 1979 to 1981 we moved over to neutrino physics at Fermi Lab. That was a totally new collaboration, looking at weak interaction nucleon form factors; doing some charge and neutral current scattering and so forth.

Aaserud:

That allows me to interject a question. The different research projects in the different places (to what extent were they a function of the places? I'm thinking in particular about the change to high-energy physics at Stanford. Was that something that you got from Stanford, and then moved here afterwards? How important were the places to the changes of interest?

Kendall:

Well, if you want to do electron physics, you have to go to the places that have electron accelerators; I think there's not much ambiguity about that. I was interested in electron and positron physics and electrodynamics, which stems from the work on positrons and positroneum. So I was quite happy to go to Stanford and continue on in electron physics. Having learned the field, I found it of continuing interest, and when they built the two-mile machine, I was quite happy going to the people there and proposing a collaboration. We stayed with that field because we knew and understood it and liked it.

Aaserud:

Who were your main collaborators in Stanford and Illinois, I suppose, and here? Are those the three main places?

Kendall:

Here the principal collaborator for many years was Jerry Friedman, and we collaborated with Richard Taylor, who was the head of Group A at Stanford. There were a lot of people in the group, about 16 or 18 people. Caltech was a collaborator, but they were not in the mainstream of what we did. When we went to Fermi Lab, we still continued to have other Stanford collaborators. We had a number of collaborators from Fermi Lab and places of that sort. The neutrino program has collaborators from Florida State, from Fermi Lab itself, from MIT, a number from Michigan State (those are the principal ones.

Aaserud:

So you would prefer to mention institutions rather than names in the collaboration?

Kendall:

Well, yes, because people came and went and so forth. Yes, it's more convenient.

Aaserud:

That's quite a change from the dissertation.

Kendall:

Oh, yes. Oh, it's definitely a much different kind of physics.

Aaserud:

Was that a difference between MIT and other places at the time?

Kendall:

No, I don't think it was different. I think many of the universities that had high-energy programs found that they were in large collaborations. They also found that they were having to travel a lot, so that was quite a common denominator.

Aaserud:

This is very quick of course, but this wasn't what we were mainly going to talk about. This was the general background on that. Just another general thing: What about family life? Are you married?

Kendall:

Yes.

Aaserud:

You married when?

Kendall:

I married in 1972.

Aaserud:

To another Bostonian?

Kendall:

No, she's a woman that, in fact, had been married to one of the collaborators that we had in the early Stanford program, and who had been at Stanford on the faculty when I was there in the late fifties. They had broken up, and then some years after that, I met her again in San Francisco and we were married in 1972.

Aaserud:

And you've stayed married since then.

Kendall:

I've stayed married since then (somewhat unique in this society, but not totally unique.

Aaserud:

I don't know how physicists figure in those statistics. I don't think they stand out at all. Do you have children?

Kendall:

Well, I don't have children of my own, but my wife has one boy who is now a physician in intern training.

Aaserud:

In what ways has your family been important in your career?

Kendall:

Well, I don't think in any striking or novel way.

Aaserud:

Then let's turn to our more specific concern. I define my concern very broadly as science policy. We can discuss of course to what extent JASON could go under that heading. If not, then I have to change the name.

Kendall:

Well, I think you should think about changing the name, because I don't think JASON got into science policy very much.

Aaserud:

But it certainly has to do with bringing physics to the world outside its immediate academic orientation.

Kendall:

Oh yes, it certainly did.

Aaserud:

My question, then, is, how and why did you come to concern yourself with that kind of broader aspects of physics?

Kendall:

Well, I've always had some interest in the problems of society in general. My father did before me. And there was the example of Karl Compton and the war effort, which had taken physics out of academia, and has led the physics community to participate in public life in a way which has proven, I think, quite irreversible. I've always been drawn to those sorts of problems. In particular the question of nuclear weapons, and the risk of nuclear war, I gave some thought to in the 1950s. Somewhere around 1960 (the question of the nuclear risk was becoming more and more obvious to people; they saw that there was a risk and that the whole nuclear arms race were out of hand.

I went to W.K.H. Panofsky, who had been doing a lot of consulting for the government, and asked him if there was a formal way in which a physicist could participate in some of these technical matters connected with defense. He told me about JASON, which had been just formed, and got me into it. That was my entry. I did not go to the first meeting, and I think I missed the first summer, but I must have come in right after that.

Aaserud:

You're an early member.

Kendall:

Oh yes, I was an early member, but I was not in at the start. I think I was in within a year, I would guess.

Aaserud:

You were a young member, too.

Kendall:

Well, there were other young members also.

Aaserud:

I guess the age was pretty much the same.

Kendall:

I think to some extent, yes.

Aaserud:

But you were on the young side, I would say.

Kendall:

Probably.

Aaserud:

I'm not sure about Zachariasen's age.

Kendall:

Well, he's roughly my age, he may even be a slight bit younger. He was at MIT in graduate school when I was here, as I recall.

Aaserud:

To backtrack a bit, you talked about Compton's involvement during the war. Was that something that you or your father or your family knew about at the time it was happening?

Kendall:

Well, my father knew. Everybody knew that the scientific community was off fighting the war. But I was still essentially at the high school level. Certainly after the war was over, it was quite clear what had happened. The first nuclear weapon was detonated in the summer of the year that I was at Kings Point Merchant Marine Academy, and my college years were spent in the revelations of much of the Manhattan Project and so forth. So it was quite clear that physics was now an important component of national life and particularly of defense.

Aaserud:

Yes, but in addition to that, you had that family connection.

Kendall:

Well, my father apparently knew about the Manhattan Project, although he never spoke of it during the war. He had apparently found out some way or other, although he had no official clearances and no involvement in it, but he certainly had gotten wind of it.

Aaserud:

So JASON was in fact your first kind of involvement with those kind of questions.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

You were not involved in any previous summer studies or private consulting.

Kendall:

No.

Aaserud:

Were you simultaneously, or was JASON your only or main effort in that direction?

Kendall:

Only effort for many years.

Aaserud:

What about other physicists; did they approach the question differently? Did your immediate colleagues do consulting?

Kendall:

Consulting, no; not to my knowledge. Very few of my contemporaries did anything similar to that. On a fractional basis, it was very small.

Aaserud:

So you asked Panofsky, and Panofsky arranged an invitation, and then you were in JASON.

Kendall:

That's correct. Then I was in, yes.

Aaserud:

What was your motivation for that?

Kendall:

Well, it was partly curiosity and partly concern. I said only partly curiosity because I was in fact at that time troubled about the nuclear war risks and was interested in knowing about it, and partly because it had already attracted some extremely intelligent people. The example is not lost on a young physicist when people of the stature of Panofsky and the other people who were then members were taking their time out to do it. And, in fact, much of the subject matter was quite interesting.

Aaserud:

I suppose you became a member in the spring of 1960?

Kendall:

I don't know whether it was the spring of 1960 or the fall of 1960 or the fall of 1961. I really don't remember exactly.

Aaserud:

And you stayed on until (

Kendall:

I stayed on until they reorganized and were moved out of IDA and found a home I believe at Stanford Research Institute. By the time they'd reconstituted there, I was no longer a member.

Aaserud:

Well, we'll get to the end of it. How much time did you spend on JASON during this period in relation to other activities?

Kendall:

Well, it was not a uniform commitment. Initially I spent probably less than some of the theoretical people because they simply had more time. I was running on various accelerators. I would go to the summer studies and would always go to the various meetings during the year. And I worked on a number of small projects. But I was not what you would call a major producer until the Vietnam War came along. Then JASON sponsored a 1963 study on counterinsurgency, and I was a member of that and got very interested in what later became the conflict in Southeast Asia.

The summer following the counter-insurgency study, there was a larger effort organized, but I don't think it sprang from JASON, although JASON provided support for it and I think JASON members largely populated it. It had to do with the war in Southeast Asia, and from that came a Department of Defense project. I then joined that project as well, so that for a number of years I was, in addition to JASON work, a consultant to the Department of Defense directly.

Aaserud:

That was unusual for JASON, but that was part of your JASON effort.

Kendall:

Well, it stemmed from the JASON effort, but as a consultant to the Department of Defense it was separate from JASON; that's what I was trying to emphasize.

Aaserud:

So your formal role in that was for the Department of Defense, not for JASON.

Kendall:

Finally, as the project within the Defense Department grew in size and scale, it had a group of scientific advisors, and I was one of them. I worked with George Kistiakowsky who was the chairman for several years, and did some work on explosives and things of that sort with him.

Aaserud:

But in effect that came out of your JASON involvement.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

So JASON was kind of a stepping stone.

Kendall:

Yes, that's correct, but at the same time I did not give up other JASON activities, and there were other JASON groups involved in this thing also.

Aaserud:

That was kind of a peak period.

Kendall:

Yes, and I put quite a bit of time in on that. I did a great deal of traveling. I was out of the country several times. I was in Southeast Asia in 1968. Eventually my involvement wound down.

Aaserud:

That was the first time I saw your name mentioned in the New York Times, I think, together with Garwin.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

Before we get to that, what connection did you have with the motivations for establishing JASON?

Kendall:

I didn't; I was not involved in that at all.

Aaserud:

Were you involved in discussions within or outside JASON about JASON at the time as that kind of vehicle? I know that there were some discussions going on.

Kendall:

Well, if there were, I was not part of it. It seemed to be a perfectly appropriate mechanism at the time for dealing with these problems. It certainly had no public notoriety.

Aaserud:

At that time of course JASON was mainly doing contracting work for the military (for ARPA, I suppose, mostly.

Kendall:

Well, in part ARPA. I can't tell you what the split is. I never knew exactly.

Aaserud:

Right. Did you take part in the Steering Committee of JASON?

Kendall:

No.

Aaserud:

Which other members did you have most to do with? Panofsky got you in; were there others?

Kendall:

Panofsky was not a formal member of JASON, if I recall correctly. He was associated with it in some way, perhaps as a Steering Committee member, but I don't recall that he was a member. There were Stanford members. Zachariasen I used to see. He was at Caltech I think at the time.

Aaserud:

Did you collaborate with other JASONs, or did you work mostly on your own?

Kendall:

Some collaboration on study groups of one sort or another.

Aaserud:

Were you involved in selection of other members in any way?

Kendall:

No.

Aaserud:

That was also a Steering Committee activity.

Kendall:

Prerogative, right.

Aaserud:

To what extent did the JASONs you collaborated with constitute the same people that you collaborated with on physics problems?

Kendall:

Not at all, essentially. Well, some of the theorists there were interested in common physics problems, but there were no other high energy physics people from my collaborations that were ever in JASON that I know of.

Aaserud:

Was that because you were an experimental physicist mostly and most others were theoretical?

Kendall:

Well, there were a number of experimenters, but not very many, and I think just probability would have suggested that the chance of getting two out of one group was not very big. In any event, there weren't two out of our group. I was the only one.

Aaserud:

What kind of contact did you have with the agencies that you contracted for? Did you have contact all the way? Did you do a project from beginning to end, and then presented it? How was that?

Kendall:

I think those depended on the nature of the project. You had what interaction you needed. If you needed interaction or cooperation, you asked for it, and you got it.

Aaserud:

But you asked for it; they didn't peek over your shoulder?

Kendall:

Well, I don't know. That would have had to do with the leaders (whether there was oversight. I don't know the answer to that.

Aaserud:

So the structure was rather that you did your work, and it was the leaders that provided that kind of link.

Kendall:

I don't know. They weren't the information conduits. We had briefings. If we were working on some particular area, we needed to visit facilities or talk to people in the field. We certainly did that.

Aaserud:

You did rather independent work, didn't you.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

But you can't mention any particular examples of contact that you had with the agencies?

Kendall:

Well, I don't remember names much any more, but I know that we had briefings. As I say, we had site visits, and frequently we would have site visits to military facilities or laboratories quite independent of the project. JASON people would arrange to have a meeting (with appropriate facility access. We'd simply get a red carpet tour and a number of briefings on the programs that were there and so forth, and that seemed to be always forthcoming. There was no difficulty with information flow.

Aaserud:

So there was a positive attitude toward JASON by the agencies.

Kendall:

Sure.

Aaserud:

Even though JASON was mostly self constituted and independent. Well, you did criticize my use of "science policy," so I suppose you would certainly describe the JASON work as more of a technical nature.

Kendall:

Yes. I think it was intended to be on the technical level and I think it was on the technical level, which is what the people were best suited to do.

Aaserud:

A typical JASON meeting (a summer meeting, for example. Maybe you could say something about what took place there, and what was the structure of work?

Kendall:

Well, because of my accelerator running schedules, I think I did not attend the full summer studies. I would drop-in. So I'm really not an expert on the structure. But I think it's no surprises. Simply work methods, the sorts of things that any group of physicists would do. They would organize themselves in a perfectly reasonable way to work on projects in collaboration.

Aaserud:

That's significant too, of course, that you were able to just drop in.

Kendall:

Oh yes. It was certainly a flexible work situation.

Aaserud:

There must have been some structure to it, though.

Kendall:

Oh, of course there was structure, but I think there was nothing exceptional about the structure. It was competently organized.

Aaserud:

We talked a little bit about Vietnam. Maybe we could talk some about the projects you were involved in before Vietnam, to the extent you even can do that, to the extent that it's not classified.

Kendall:

Well, I don't have too much to say in those areas. I did work for a while on anti-submarine warfare, and I did get involved in an unclassified JASON project working for the Department of Transportation on advanced air traffic control procedures. Richard Garwin was chairman of that sub-panel, and we spent some time reviewing that whole system. That was a period of major air traffic delays, major difficulties in the technology, very similar to today. I was interested in that, partly because it was an interesting problem, partly because it was a break with the classified work, and partly because I had some background in aviation. So I volunteered for it.

Aaserud:

What was that background?

Kendall:

Well, I am a pilot, and so I knew something about aircraft and how they operated.

Aaserud:

How early was that?

Kendall:

That was roughly 1968.

Aaserud:

That was an aberration at the time from military work.

Kendall:

Well, we would not infrequently be briefed on unclassified subjects. We had, I remember, briefings from the Bureau of Reclamation on some environmental problems. But the bulk of the JASON work was classified. But the air traffic control study was a fairly large effort, and it was totally unclassified.

Aaserud:

And it was with Garwin.

Kendall:

Garwin was the head of it. Harold Lewis, who later was head of JASON, was a member of it. I've now forgotten the other panel members. Luis Alvarez was on it.

Aaserud:

I've spoken to Hal Lewis. I haven't spoke to Luis Alvarez. Was he active during that whole period in JASON?

Kendall:

Yes. Well, from time to time. He was active on that panel.

Aaserud:

And then it was the Navy project and projects that were classified.

Kendall:

Yes, and there were other Navy projects that I was involved in too.

Aaserud:

Who were the main collaborators?

Kendall:

There was a rather large group. I think there was certainly nine or a dozen. I remember Walter Munk being on many of those Navy panels, his evident interest.

Aaserud:

He was heading a lot of them too. He was the main contact with the Navy people.

Kendall:

I don't recall whether or not that was true. I don't remember.

Aaserud:

Would you have any suggestions for a study or project within JASON that would provide a good inroad for understanding the workings of JASON? I mean, if I were to write up a history of JASON's first ten or fifteen years, is there a good project that I could supply in some detail as an example?

Kendall:

I think you probably ought to ask someone like Garwin that. They'd be in a better position to tell you. Garwin keeps much more accurate track of what was classified and what wasn't than I do. That's a whole sub-specialty in itself, knowing what to say and what not to say.

Aaserud:

I'm not going to press you on that.

Kendall:

Well, I just don't know of a good example, and I don't know where the classification bounds are. I can tell you that there is one unclassified source ("the Pentagon Papers." They were released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and those contain some mention of JASON projects which you might look at.

Aaserud:

Of course, there's the SESPA publication, or quasi-publication, criticizing JASON as well; I have that. I haven't seen the "Pentagon Papers."

Kendall:

Well, the "Pentagon Papers" do have mention of that. What they mention is connected with the outgrowth of the counter-insurgency effort, which became ultimately a Department of Defense project.

Aaserud:

Which you got into eventually?

Kendall:

I didn't get into it eventually, I got into it at its beginning.

Aaserud:

What about the relationship of JASON projects to academic work in physics?

Kendall:

None whatever that I was aware of. Not so far as I personally was concerned. There was no relation whatever.

Aaserud:

But still you were able to use your physics expertise.

Kendall:

Yes. Oh yes. Physicists, whether correctly or incorrectly, do think they can move from field to field, and I have done that to some extent.

Aaserud:

What about the political views within JASON? Were they diverse or rather similar?

Kendall:

I think there was something of a spectrum in the group, as there is in any group of people, or any group of physicists, for that matter.

Aaserud:

Did that affect the work in any way?

Kendall:

No, I don't believe so.

Aaserud:

Maybe the choice of projects?

Kendall:

That I don't know. I could not tell you that.

Aaserud:

Not in your case anyway.

Kendall:

Not in my case. Well, no, that's not entirely true, because I certainly was aware very early that the United States' involvement in South Vietnam was unwise, and that the problems that the country faced there were not understood by our leadership. I put a great deal of time into that over a number of years, and my interest in that stemmed from the feeling that the United States' participation in that effort was going to end very badly. I think there was a near unanimous feeling in the JASON group that that was the case. I think everybody realized that things were bent out of shape in Vietnam.

Aaserud:

Which of course wasn't the understanding of the people criticizing JASON for that, but that's another matter.

Kendall:

Well, President Johnson was said to have gotten notably upset when the news of our trip hit the New York Times.

Aaserud:

So you would say that for the JASONs involved in the Vietnam effort in that sense, that was from a critical attitude to the war, rather than the opposite.

Kendall:

I think that's correct. Yes, it certainly was, and it was certainly true of George Kistiakowsky, who became the leader of the Department of Defense advisory group that I was on. It's certainly true. He was acutely aware of the defects in US position and strategy over there, and made a huge attempt to see that changed but without avail. He eventually resigned from the project, and not much later than that I resigned too, because the government was not paying any real attention to the facts.

Aaserud:

What about the demand for secrecy within JASON? Did that lead to any problems in terms of say publications?

Kendall:

I don't think so. I mean, things that are properly kept secret are properly kept secret, and no one proposes that they be published. At least in that era there was not too much that was troubling. I think now it's a different time, and there is more material kept secret that should not be. But I think the matters that JASON dealt with were quite properly kept secret and there was no difficulty with that.

Aaserud:

To what extent did the criticism against JASON (especially about the Vietnam involvement, because that was the only time that JASON really reached the surface (in the media and otherwise, affect you?

Kendall:

Well, I was not affected by that criticism. I never became publicly notorious for my support of those activities. I think the people who criticized JASON did not really have a clear understanding of what the group was doing, what it was trying to do, or what its motivations were. I have certainly never felt any qualms about what I did in that, and would do it again in similar circumstances. It was clear, somewhat after the fact, that the government was not interested in the advice that was given it and didn't intend to take it and did not take it. George Kistiakowsky, with his much superior political skills, sensed this somewhat earlier than the rest of us. I think in retrospect had I known the government was going to disregard our information and advice, I would have quit earlier than I did, but probably not much earlier. Perhaps about the time Kistiakowsky stopped. I think there was certainly nothing that was done in that area that anybody involved had any reason to be ashamed of in any sense. As I say, I was not touched by the criticism. Some of the other people were.

Aaserud:

It raises the question of course of what you can do from the inside.

Kendall:

Well, the things you can do from the inside are very simply stated. You can give the government advice, and if the government senses that that advice is helpful, it will take it. Or they may take it. In any event you will remain friends with the system. And if the government does not like your advice, then they will not take it, and you have very little prospect of forcing it through. That's my experience, and I think that's the common experience of most people. There is a limited range of action you have from inside, and a somewhat larger one from outside.

Aaserud:

Did your quitting JASON have anything to do with the reaction to that kind of involvement?

Kendall:

No, not at all. In fact, I parted with JASON on more or less mutually amicable terms. They were reorganizing and just quietly dropped a lot of people, and by 1972 or 1973, when that was going on, I really had not much interest in continuing with them. By 1973 I was in fact already getting considerable public attention for my part in the nuclear reactor debate, and had very little interest in continuing in JASON. By that time, I was aware of the limitations on inside advice, and I was already involved with the Union of Concerned Scientists, as one of only one or two people keeping it going. That was why I drifted out of classified work.

Aaserud:

You turned to a quite different approach.

Kendall:

That's correct, and one I think which has more potential for altering the course of government and national affairs, specifically on issues which the government itself doesn't want to change.

Aaserud:

As you say, it was probably difficult to do both.

Kendall:

I simply didn't have the time. And I felt that the JASON projects were less rewarding than they had been, and the nuclear reactor debate was warming up, in fact was hot.

Aaserud:

What did the reorganization of JASON that you spoke about consist of?

Kendall:

Well, I never really knew. If I'm described as part of the blue-collar workers, it happened in the executive suite. But my scanty information suggests that there just grew to be a parting of the ways between JASON and its sponsors. It was thrown out to look for a home, and I think it looked for a while and found one at SRI for some years. It has an even different sponsor now.

Aaserud:

The MITRE Corporation.

Kendall:

MITRE took it over.

Aaserud:

Just a few years ago, actually.

Kendall:

I see.

Aaserud:

Did you ever have any conflict yourself between contact with media and the demand for secrecy within JASON?

Kendall:

No, because my entire career at JASON was conducted totally out of the public domain. I had no contact with the media on JASON issues at all, ever, and so no possibility for any abrasion ever arose.

Aaserud:

Did you have any more contact or involvement in more Union of Concerned Scientists like, operations, while you were in JASON? That could have led to such problems?

Kendall:

No. No, by the time UCS was getting to be roaring along, I was out of the JASON group. They never intersected.

Aaserud:

Two completely different periods of your life.

Kendall:

That's right. Well, there was a chronological overlap, but it was in a period where the one was winding down and the other was winding up, and it just turned out to be no interaction.

Aaserud:

So that problem just never came up.

Kendall:

Never came up.

Aaserud:

What about the relationship of JASON involvement with the larger physics community at the time?

Kendall:

I think there was no particular intersection there. Nothing there of interest to note, I would say.

Aaserud:

And again, the criticism of JASON from some physicists was not in any way a reason for your quitting.

Kendall:

No, it was not. It was not.

Aaserud:

Because it was a hard time for some, particularly for people at Columbia and Berkeley. I guess those were the two hottest places during that time.

Kendall:

I think so, yes. But I never saw, or was the object of, any public outrage at all.

Aaserud:

During that period of JASON that you were a member, how unique was it as an institution for combining basic research and government advice?

Kendall:

Well, it was unique for me personally, but there were other organizations which did somewhat similar things. The whole Institute for Defense Analyses itself was based on a Rand model, and there were certainly other advisory committees to government. There were other advisory committees to components of the Defense Department, to the military services, and to pieces of the Pentagon itself.

I think the group was probably more luminous than any other, in terms of the distinguished credentials of the people on it. I mean, there was a period when they were winning a Nobel Prize a year. So that obviously set it off.

Aaserud:

I guess most other bodies were either full time or more ad hoc.

Kendall:

Well, there were others that were constituted somewhat differently. There was the Defense Science Board and there was the Foreign Intelligence Board and there was the President's Scientific Advisory Committee for as long as it existed. In fact, there was some commonality of membership between JASON and PSAC, and they used to work in a somewhat similar way. But obviously they reported to a different boss, and they were supported in different ways. But they were still part time physics people, and as I said, many of them were JASON group people.

Aaserud:

It's another question, of course, how much sense it makes to treat JASON as a unit. There was a lot of people in JASON who were involved in other capacities too. It's a complicated thing to define the boundaries. You said before that in your case at any rate there was no relationship between physics research at the university level and advising activity at JASON.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

Nevertheless as a physicist you seem to have been up to the task. Do you have any comment on that? Were physicists specifically suited for that task or could others have done the same kind of advice?

Kendall:

Well, I don't know. First of all, JASON was not by any means wholly composed of physicists. There were geophysicists, biologists, chemists (all sorts of people.

Aaserud:

Mostly physicists, though.

Kendall:

Well, it was more physics than anything else. And I suppose that that weighting tended to affect the selection of topics. But on the whole, there are not terribly many biology topics in the Defense Department tasks. There are a few, and we had a few biologists. But I think the group had been started and was polarized around the physics discipline. I think many of the problems that gravitated toward it would naturally be physics problems, or involve heavy components of them. I suppose there was some selection of physics problems too because of the interests of people. So I think it's perfectly natural, not surprising at all.

Aaserud:

But in some sense it's by chance, from the history of it, that it was a group of physicists.

Kendall:

Well, it's not totally by chance. You look at the major weapons problems, and they all present physics problems. People who came out of the war effort as senior scientific advisors to the various large projects were almost uniformly physicists. You know, there wouldn't be very many geologists and so forth in the Manhattan Project. Some, but not many.

Aaserud:

Well, we've made the distinction before (never on tape, I think, but before we started (between the white collar and the blue collar kind of JASON. Relating to that, I think it was Ruderman who divided the JASONs in a somewhat different way, that is, those who went to JASON because that was the only kind of advising activity that they could conceive of that did not interfere with their academic work, and the others who used JASON more as a springboard to get onto other kinds of science advising activities. Would you consider JASON as a springboard for further advising activities?

Kendall:

Well, I think it could have been for people who wanted to do it. There were some people who found that a lot of advising was congenial to them, and they may have found their advice listened to one way or another. I think some people did gravitate into a more active advising role in many other areas, and I think JASON may have provided some candidates for PSAC. I certainly didn't belong in that category. In any large organization like that you will find some people who like the work particularly and would like to do more of it and find a way to do it, so in that sense it's a springboard. That's not bad at all. I was not in that category; I had plenty to do. I used it as a springboard in one sense, to stay on with the Department of Defense (it wasn't counter-insurgency by 1967 or 1968 (the Southeast Asia operation, but I was not headed upward and onward as an advisor. So I was in your first category of people.

Aaserud:

Yes. To what extent can you talk about that counter-insurgency thing in detail?

Kendall:

Well, I don't really want to get into it much. I don't know what's classified and what isn't classified. What's in the "Pentagon Papers" identifies it as a barrier scheme. I was involved in the origin of that, and seeing that it was partially implemented. As I say, I don't know the status of the classification.

Aaserud:

Bill Nierenberg has written some kind of history of it.

Kendall:

He may have. I haven't seen it, but it would be interesting.

Aaserud:

Yes. I have a copy of that.

Kendall:

I'd certainly enjoy looking at it.

Aaserud:

I'll make a copy and send it up to you.

Kendall:

Thank you.

Aaserud:

I will have to be reminded when I listen to your tape again, but will try to remember before that. What about JASON in the context of other science policy involvements? You didn't have too many other involvements of the sort at the time.

Kendall:

None whatever.

Aaserud:

So that question doesn't apply to you. But maybe you would have some comments about the impact of JASON. How important was JASON for say national policy decisions?

Kendall:

Well, I have never believed that JASON had a first order impact on policy, except by the indirect route of giving good technical advice and preventing projects that were technically flawed from proceeding very far or by improving others. We sometimes did that. Its impact on Vietnam was nil or close to nil. I say this in retrospect. I didn't think so at the time. My experience was not as good as I believe it is now. But I think in retrospect it was unrealistic for anybody to think that whatever JASON could do would have deflected the course of that war. It apparently had to play itself out as it did, to exhaustion, and get a major total societal turning in the United States against it before it could be stopped. It was quite clear that President Johnson had no interest in stopping the war on any terms short of the victory he sought, and scientists who visited him (outside the JASON umbrella) got a rough reception. I recall hearing that Ed Purcell had visited Johnson along with other scientists. You might ask him about that. So, as a means to alter a national policy I think the JASON mechanism is not one of choice. That's not the right way to do it. That's not what it was set up to do and it's not coupled into policy-making levels. It gives technical advice and that may or may not be taken, depending on which way the wind is blowing.

Aaserud:

But how often was there an intention on the part of JASON to have that kind of impact?

Kendall:

I don't think very much. I don't think anybody misunderstood the role that JASON had all along, which was to provide superior technical advice on technical projects, and occasionally when subjects came up which involved policy matters on which JASON people felt strongly. The war in Southeast Asia was the one striking example I know of. As I said, in retrospect it was unrealistic to think they could have affected it, although many people thought so at the time.

Aaserud:

It could have intended impacts and unintended impacts.

Kendall:

Oh, of course, because we might have developed some ferocious new weapon. Or invented a counter to a ferocious old weapon or something of that sort. So technical developments obviously can have deep and profound and persistent impact on society, and the way society goes. But I know of no real examples on a grand level of that sort that JASON ever contributed. But that isn't to say that there were not many things done that were solid and competent.

Aaserud:

What about on the educational side (both educating physicists or scientists to become broader in some respects, and also having some impact on the bureaucratic and military side.

Kendall:

Well, I can only speak for myself on that issue. I found the JASON experience deeply educating. I learned an immense amount. And a lot of that has been put to good use in subsequent years with the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Aaserud:

We'll get back to that; that's interesting.

Kendall:

I'm going to have to break off at 4.

Aaserud:

OK. While we're at that impact question, would you have any suggestion for how to look that up? I mean, which people did the JASONs have contact with that could have a better feel for how JASON advice was taken up and how seriously it was considered?

Kendall:

Well, I think that with respect to the Southeast Asia business, the person who would have known a great deal about that was George Kistiakowsky, but he's unfortunately not with us any more. But I think I can answer that question in part. The final impact of JASON efforts in the SE Asia conflict was essentially nil. Now, on other matters, you could ask Richard Garwin, or others, because they will know for whom JASON worked and what it accomplished (in the Navy, the Air Force and so forth.

Aaserud:

So it would make sense to talk to say the chief scientist of ARPA or IDA.

Kendall:

Well, I don't know who's at IDA now. I think I would have asked Marvin Goldberger or somebody like him to give you references. I just can't supply any good ones.

Aaserud:

So your quitting JASON was essentially for practical reasons.

Kendall:

Yes, practical reasons. I lost interest in it. They lost interest in me. And I had other fish to fry. And by that time I had discovered that being inside was not an effective way to change national policy. I learned that directly through the episode with Southeast Asia, but I had seen it in many of the other activities having to do with nuclear weapons. There had also been the episode, some time in that period, of the supersonic transport that Garwin played a heavy role in. It was a telling example to many of us. It became clear from that episode that the government would not take advice it didn't like, even when the advice was technically of superb quality. It was the upshot of that controversy that led Nixon to scrap PSAC in its entirety because it was giving him advice he didn't like. Well, none of these examples was lost on me and so by 1969, when UCS was getting started, I was a ready volunteer, and in some measure partially trained.

Aaserud:

So in that sense your quitting was a matter of principle.

Kendall:

It wasn't a matter of moral principle. Well, if you want to look for a deep principle, it was the principle of effectiveness, namely that continuing did not look to be effective.

Aaserud:

Yes, I didn't mean anything more than that.

Kendall:

No, I understand.

Aaserud:

How clear was that in your mind at the time of the conception of the Union of Concerned Scientists?

Kendall:

Well, it was reasonably clear. It's unfair to credit me with enormous foresight, but on the other hand, I certainly went into it with some sense that it had potential. I think no one could reasonably have expected that it would persist (and persist for so many years (and ultimately have a very substantial impact in some aspects of national affairs. I think that this is a fair statement at this point. I did not really see that, but on the other hand, I certainly sensed that it had some potential. And I stuck with it, and was in fact one of the handful of people (handful meaning as few as two (who kept it going through the years.

Aaserud:

I looked at some papers of Bernard Feld today, and I noticed a letter he sent in 1970 providing advice (I don't exactly remember the context (to some MIT committee. He wrote that by now one knew that inside kind of criticism did not always work, and one would have to find some other kind of approach. So this may be part of a more general conception at the time. Did you feel that?

Kendall:

Well, no, I'm not sure I felt exactly that. I reached my own conclusions, without comparing notes with terribly many other people. The Union of Concerned Scientists was largely organized (I would say almost entirely organized, with only very few exceptions (by people who did not have clearances and were not involved in inside advising. There were one or two who had been, but as I say, the bulk of them were not. And so I think the motivation for those people was largely that they had no other outlet for their concerns. I can't speak for anyone but myself among those who had clearances, but I certainly was aware that the inside effort was not very fruitful. So I was looking for other avenues too.

Aaserud:

The case of the discussion over ABMs in the 1960s (

Kendall:

Yes, well, UCS was born around that issue, and I went to Washington with a group from UCS, and we had a news conference and gave some testimony in Congress and so forth on ABM. That was a very live issue.

Aaserud:

What I was going to say was that the discussions of ABM in the 1960s and SDI in the 1980s are similar, SDI being essentially an extended ABM, I suppose. And you have criticized the one from the inside and the other from the outside, to some extent. I don't know to what extent you were involved in the ABM issue in JASON.

Kendall:

I really wasn't involved in it, certainly not very much. I heard a lot of the briefings, but I was never part of any of the working groups on the subject.

Aaserud:

So that from your perspective it's not a valid comparison in that way. I was thinking that might be a good example of attacking two similar problems, one from the inside, one from the outside, but if not, then we could go on. To what extent were you involved in the very origins of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and what was the motivation for it?

Kendall:

Well, the UCS sprang to life so to speak because of great unrest on the college campuses and the universities about the course of the Vietnam War, and to some extent around the ABM debate which became very lively in 1968 and 1969. The activities at MIT flowed primarily originally from students who in the fall of 1968 started the Students Action Coordinating Committee, SACC, and went to faculty in the physics department (Kurt Gottfried, Francis Low and a group of others (and asked to get faculty support and have them join this group. The faculty simply felt that the group was too radical and no doubt evanescent, so it was on that view that UCS was born, independent of SACC, and primarily a staff and faculty organization.

I was here at the time, and Kurt Gottfried was a close friend, and I so was drawn in. I was not one of the major workers in the organization, because I still held clearances and was still active in JASON. But by the time the actual public events started (when we went public, which was the week of March 4, 1969 (I decided to stand aside from the strategic questions because of my clearances, and to get involved in more the environmental end of things; I was in charge, and was the organizer, of all the non-nuclear UCS activities. I initiated the organizing meetings for them, and we formed our own steering committee for that part of the UCS effort.

We soon had 300 people on our own rolls, but it didn't last long. There was a weak echo a year later, and then by 18 months after that, everybody had lost interest except just a very small handful. All of what I would describe as the nuclear activities disappeared totally within a year and a half, and all that was left was what I was basically running.

Aaserud:

In the Feld papers, your first contribution to USC was a paper from 4 March 1970 on environmental problems.

Kendall:

I certainly did that for UCS still going then. But I helped draft some of the documentation for 1969 also (a statement of objectives, much of that stuff. Kurt Gottfried could tell you about that. But in 1969 I organized and ran the group concerned with environmental problems.

Aaserud:

OK, yes. Of course the first March 4th activity was in part a collaboration with SACC.

Kendall:

Oh yes.

Aaserud:

What about SESPA, were they part of the same developments?

Kendall:

What's that? My question is your answer, I think.

Aaserud:

Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action.

Kendall:

Whatever it is, the answer is no, as far as I know.

Aaserud:

Who were the main organizers behind UCS, besides yourself and Gottfried?

Kendall:

I really started putting in work as of March 4, 1969 and after, when I organized the ongoing activities in environmental pollution. I think much of the general organizing work was done by Gottfried, Low, Feshbach, and people from the chemistry department. That's all in the old literature, and I don't remember all the names and details.

Aaserud:

And then of course it developed as an organization, but its origins were mainly at MIT.

Kendall:

Yes. If you want to consider Gottfried an MIT-er the answer is yes, he was a visitor for a year in the MIT Physics Dept. but was on the Cornell faculty at the time. And people came in from other places and helped, and there was a national teach-in at the time organized by MIT, but it drew in a lot of people. March 4 was a national event.

Aaserud:

Yes, certainly. Well, it was not subscribed to by everybody.

Kendall:

Oh, absolutely not by everybody. A lot of very conservative people on the MIT faculty, many of them in the engineering departments, were bitterly opposed to it all.

Aaserud:

I saw a lot of correspondence back and forth (especially relating to laying down or stopping research on the 4th of March (seeing the actions as contradicting academic freedom. It certainly was something that had an effect in some ways, and it was successful to the extent that it raised a lot of attention.

Kendall:

Well, it raised attention and it set a model for the beginnings of the organization.

Aaserud:

So that was the beginning of your concern, but you really got seriously into it a little later.

Kendall:

I got seriously into it right then, on March 4. That's when I started organizing. There was a meeting down in Room 6-120, that I chaired, for those people who were interested in environmental matters, and I started right away. That's when I started putting in quite a bit of time.

Aaserud:

For practical reasons that was the side of the work for you. Then you gradually stopped your work in JASON, and got into the more general part of it. You quit JASON in 1970?

Kendall:

I don't remember. I just sort of drifted out. I think I was out by 1973, but I don't remember; it could have been 1972. I was not much active after 1971 or 1972. It was what you would call an indefinite ending.

Aaserud:

The UCS then became your main activity in that area. Were there others or was it a transition mainly from JASON to UCS?

Kendall:

I had plenty to do. That was all I had on my plate.

Aaserud:

Like in JASON, there was little relationship between actual physics work and work for the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Kendall:

Yes, none whatever.

Aaserud:

The Union of Concerned Scientists reflected a big change, of course, in approach to that kind of problem, especially the practice of going public with things. Did you build on any experience of other physicists in that respect? Did you have a model for how to go about it?

Kendall:

No. I just simply started with an ingot and just made whatever it is we did. I'm not beholden to very many people that I can recall for examples in the area, although in my years at Stanford, I had some contact with the environmental community. I had known David Brower, who was head of the Sierra Club for many years, and everyone had read Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. Those were examples that were in the public domain, and certainly indicated some methods of approach. But the detailed operational procedures of the UCS were worked out as we went along.

Aaserud:

So, that the environmental concern was a longstanding interest of yours.

Kendall:

Oh yes.

Aaserud:

It was not just something you did because you couldn't do other things; it was a real and positive concern.

Kendall:

Oh yes, I was very much interested in that, controlling the destruction.

Aaserud:

One particular example of entering the public sphere was the method of Congressional testimony.

Kendall:

Well, that came later. We gave Congressional testimony in 1969, but it didn't amount to anything. By the time I was giving Congressional testimony on reactor safety and things of that sort, we knew what we were doing, and our approach was beginning to have teeth in it.

Aaserud:

So that the use of other kinds of media precedes the Congressional testimony.

Kendall:

Yes.

Aaserud:

Well, what are examples of the first experiences of that kind of effort?

Kendall:

Well, we had numerous examples. As I look back on that part of UCS that I was involved in, which continued on through many years, and as I compare that with many other citizen groups that I have seen at various stages of formation (some established, some struggling to get established, some just being organized (we made basically the right choices all along, right from the beginning. We made good choices of how we planned what we would do, how we picked topics, and how we approached them. I mean, we did not take choices that led to waste of time, or ineffective projects; we became effective right from the start. We stated close to home and organized a number of local subjects. Close to 1969 and later the working group did studies to support the implementation of the Clean Air Act, did technical studies, got other experts to support our views, and gave testimony in Massachusetts legislature. We did essentially a muckraking study of the Department of Public Health, which was in scandalous shape at the time. We got publicity from that.

And then in 1971, I got into the big issue, the reactor safety business, which basically made UCS a nationally known organization. By that time, we had already learned reasonably completely how to proceed, although we had no resources to speak of. On the safety business we did a technical study, wrote a paper, had a news conference, and we were launched.

Aaserud:

Then you were really covered, on a week to week basis at any rate, it seems (not quite, but close. I looked at the New York Times during the period, and the first mention is in July 1971.

Kendall:

That's right, that was our first news conference.

Aaserud:

And then it goes on and on.

Kendall:

Oh yes, we've been cited in the New York Times an enormous number of times, over the years; it must be between one and two hundred times, I guess.

Session II: 26 November 1986

Dr. Aaserud:

We're back in Henry Kendall's office the day after, the 26th of November, 1986, and we are continuing our interview, which yesterday went up to the transition from JASON involvement to the Union of Concerned Scientists involvement, the origins of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and your involvement in that.

We could start now perhaps with a little more detail on the actual involvements of the Union of Concerned Scientists. The activity that stands out, from the media at any rate, is the critique of the Atomic Energy Commission and its licensing practice of nuclear reactors. I think we mentioned yesterday that that started (or the media started covering that (on the 27th of July 1971. You said that that reflected your first press conference.

Dr. Kendall:

No, I did not say that. In fact, I said quite the opposite. That was far from the first press conference that we had. We had been having press conferences for two years, since 1969.

Aaserud:

On that particular issue?

Kendall:

Not on that particular issue. But we had certainly had press conferences and had developed a modus operandi: generating technical studies, having press conferences, and ultimately giving testimony, either by invitation or by soliciting invitations. Our way of doing business had already been well established.

It is true that that was the opening gun, so to speak, on the nuclear reactor safety debate. And that report and press conference was followed by another one, I think in October of that year. Not long after that we became involved in the major hearings that went on for about two years on the subject of emergency core cooling and reactor safety.

This reactor effort, started when the Union of Concerned Scientists, was very small. Indeed there were really just two of us by early 1972 who carried the Union and its name through.

Aaserud:

That was you and...

Kendall:

(Daniel Ford. There was a small vestigial group at MIT who had no contact with reactor safety. My own interests in the nuclear arms race never abated, but there seemed to be no satisfactory opening for making that a matter of public controversy. But I did initiate a study of the consequences of nuclear war early in the 1970s.

Aaserud:

That was also within the Union of Concerned Scientists?

Kendall:

Yes it was the Union of Concerned scientists. But it was with one or two people. We got a little MIT money to support it. But the time was obviously not ripe for taking this material public, and it stayed on the shelf. It wasn't until later, in 1977, that I reintroduced an emphasis on the nuclear arms race. I was searching continuously (or (for ways to get into that subject. It's much more important, in my opinion, and has always been so, than reactor safety. By 1981, our arms race effort was beginning to be successful, and now UCS has got a very heavy commitment to the nuclear arms controversy.

Aaserud:

Maybe we should stay a little with that early period. The size of the Union of Concerned Scientists went down rather drastically; is that a correct?

Kendall:

It went down from many hundreds of people who had nominally subscribed in 1969 (to a handful. Of course, we were not a really formal organization in any sense in the late sixties and early seventies. It was not until the reactor safety controversy proceeded and Dan and I felt the need for a more stable operation that we began to solicit funds on a continuing basis. Eventually, some time after 1975 (we'd have to look at the record to get the date correct (we incorporated UCS in Washington as a tax-exempt organization, and created a formal board of directors; an entity that people could give money to. Eventually, we had a full time secretary for a year, and some offices that we got at no cost, and then, in the middle seventies, we moved into rented headquarters near Harvard Square. From then on the growth has been continuous.

Aaserud:

You were chairman already before that formalization.

Kendall:

Yes. To the extent that anybody was chairman, I suppose I was, although there was no formal structure really. Other people had been chairman on and off, in the 1969, 1970, 1971 period. But by the time we had formalized our structure, I basically was the chairman and have continued to be the chair up to the present time.

Aaserud:

So 1971 was kind of a low, at least in the size of the organization.

Kendall:

1971, 1972 into 1973, I would say.

Aaserud:

Why was it then that the media picked up on this and not as much on the earlier concerns?

Kendall:

Well, I think the earlier concerns were being broadly voiced by very many groups in the society. I don't think that the Union of Concerned Scientists in 1969 or 1970 had any unique approach or any unique message. The material was broadly known, had been matter of a public controversy for a long time; UCS had nothing really to contribute to the debate. With the reactor safety business, the circumstances were totally different. We had much new information of risks and threats in an entirely new field. We were alone in acquiring the information, interpreting it, and setting it out to the public in a way that was understandable. We became a unique group at that time, and got a reputation that suited those circumstances. We became nationally known very quickly once that started.

Aaserud:

It was a justified coverage by the media in that respect.

Kendall:

Well, they must have thought so.

Aaserud:

You thought so too, you're saying now.

Kendall:

Well, I'm giving you an evaluation in retrospect. But it was clear at the time to everybody concerned that we had novel information, and it was also clear that we were the only ones that had it, understood it, and kept getting it in a continuous stream over a period of many years. We have remained the most technically competent group of critics in the United States on reactor safety, and that has persisted; it's still true.

Aaserud:

Even at that time you were referred to as a specific organization. You were not referred to as individuals, but you were referred to as UCS.

Kendall:

We used the organization name. That was the organization under whose name the petitions went in. That was the name that was used in participating in legal controversies, in generating court papers, and so forth. There was a reason for that, because it helps to have an organization, particularly when you're involved in large public controversies, and once you have it, it's a mistake to bypass it and start to get many names associated with the controversy. UCS has quite properly been the name that we focused on, and it's the one that's had public recognition.

Aaserud:

If we're not talking in retrospect and try to understand the origins of the involvement of that particular problem, what was it that brought your attention to that?

Kendall:

Well, it was a very simple matter. In fact, there had been a small effort, which again I initiated I think in late 1969 or 1970, to have one of the people then associated with UCS do some looking at reactor safety; but that did not come to very much, for a variety of reasons. In 1971 Daniel Ford, who at that time had graduated from Harvard, was working with the Economics Research Center under Vasily Leontieff at Harvard. He had been studying what the economists call the residuals of pollution control measures and environmental damage from an economic point of view. He had gotten to looking at nuclear power, and had discovered some unsettling information about safety. He had discovered that the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant in Plymouth, Massachusetts, was up for construction license, as I recall, and he joined as an intervener in that. Recognizing that his own technical skills (that is in the physics and engineering of reactor safety (was not advanced he came to the Union of Concerned Scientists, to James Mackenzie and me. We had a meeting at Harvard, which who in the early spring of 1971. That was the formal involvement of UCS in it, and very quickly Daniel and I found that we worked well together and became colleagues in the effort.

From then on we worked jointly on the matter, and we initiated the study group on reactor safety. We had other people helping us, particularly Jim Mackenzie, a Ph.D. physicist on the staff here at MIT in the physics department, who eventually moved out of formal physics, went to work for the Audubon Society, continued contact with UCS for a number of years, worked in the Carter White House during that Presidency for the Council on Environmental Quality, and then came back to work for UCS in Washington for a number of years. He's just left us this spring. He has been very helpful with our affairs over many years. During the period he was a volunteer, sometimes more sometimes less, but especially so from 1969 into the early 1970s.

In any event, that was the origin of our participation in nuclear affairs. Then the issue was brought to a point when we challenged the Atomic Energy Commission with the results that there were large scale hearings organized in Washington, that I referred to (the so called ECCS, Emergency Core Cooling System hearings (in which we were the principal critics, and in which Daniel and I carried the technical case. That was the first big break on reactor safety.

Aaserud:

Was that a natural thing for a person of Ford's background to do (to work with the Union of Concerned Scientists (or is that an expansion of the kind of people doing that?

Kendall:

I think the whole thing was somewhat unusual. Today the Union of Concerned Scientists has 100,000 members, it is a stable organization, now being 17 years old, with a budget of three million and a half dollars and a permanent staff of 35 or 50 people, with offices in both Cambridge and Washington. There is no other example in which two people from the academic community, one who stayed with it and who dropped out, formed an organization of that size and that particular set of skills and particular working characteristics. We are essentially the high tech end of the environmental movement. So it's unique.

Aaserud:

But from the point of view of say the 4th of March activities, was the involvement of a person from a non-scientific background natural?

Kendall:

Well, I always wonder when speaking of an economist as nonscientific. I suppose technically he is, but there are many economists who have had things to do with technical issues of one sort or another. It's obvious that reactor safety is not an economist's prime object of interest. But Daniel has proven to be quite a versatile person, although he did not practiced economics for very long. He is now a writer for the New Yorker. But I suppose one could say that it's not usual to have an economist turn to New Yorker writer either. He's also a potent cross-examiner and can write legal documents with considerable skill.

Aaserud:

An economist would never be thought of as a JASON member, so that's a difference there that shows the broader scope of the Union.

Kendall:

And we have also, as circumstances required, solicited people to help us with various technical aspects (technical in the broad sense (of whatever we happened to be working on. We've had other economists work with us in the past, and we've had biologists and lawyers and writers and all sorts of people. If we need them, we ask them.

Aaserud:

Let's continue to talk about the contact with media. There was a press conference on the 4th of January, 1973; I'm still using the New York Times as a source.

Kendall:

Well, you have more information than I have, so I hope I'm not embarrassed, by all this. There was a continuous string of press conferences, and I don't remember which one that was.

Aaserud:

Well, that was the one in which Ralph Nader participated, I think for the first time.

Kendall:

Yes, well, that stemmed from observations during the ECCS hearing. Those are probably too long and detailed to go into, but to boil it down, it became clear that there were certainly severe technical problems in reactors. At the outset it seemed to me that the people in the industry and in the regulatory agency were unaware of them and that they should be called to their attention and evaluated. It took some while for me to understand that they were not quite as ignorant as that, that they understood these problems fairly well, and in fact had gone to great lengths to cover them up.

As the hearings proceeded, it became clear that they were being run in a grossly biased way, that information was intentionally being suppressed and secreted, and that government nuclear safety researchers, in the past and during the hearing, had pressure put on them not to tell the results of their researches, or to give voice to their concerns or to the implications of their work. It was also clear that the Atomic Energy Commission and the industry had no intention whatever of doing anything about this whole safety issue.

In sum, it was obvious that a new approach was necessary, and we intentionally solicited Nader with a view to getting him involved in the controversy. It took six months to convince him that the controversy was technically well-founded enough to justify his coming in. It took quite a while of feeding information and briefing his lieutenants, until finally he did decide to join. As a result he came in with both feet and became a major participant in the controversy. He was of course well known at that time, and his impact on the controversy was substantial.

Aaserud:

So he was introduced by the UCS.

Kendall:

Yes.

Aaserud:

How effective was that approach?

Kendall:

Well, it opened up the Nader constituency to his exposition of all these views, and I think in the long run it was very helpful. It's a different way of looking toward the solution of technical problems in the society, the total opposite of the insider's approach. But there are certain practical problems for which there is no other mechanism.

Aaserud:

And that increasingly became your realization in your dealings with the AEC and your experience with the nuclear safety problem.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

And that was entirely separate from anything you had experienced from the inside before?

Kendall:

Well, I think perhaps I had experienced it and been unaware of it in its full glory. It's not possible not to speak in retrospect to some extent. In fact, that had happened with respect to the Vietnam War. That did not become clear for a number of years, simply because the whole conflict in Southeast Asia was of such large scope. The government's role in prosecuting it in part in a clandestine way, the government's interest in keeping it going, its reluctance to search for other ways of terminating the war, except by exhaustion of the attempt to win it (none of that became clear for a number of years. So, as I say, while there was some evidence of it, the whole story wasn't clear until well into the seventies.

So my own realization of these matters certainly was developing through the seventies. But by 1973 or so, things had pretty well jelled, I would say, and we no longer looked in any sense to the Atomic Energy Commission or to the Congress for relief; we took the whole business public and we did it in as big a way as we could.

Aaserud:

Did you feel that kind of institutional pressure for conformity while a JASON member?

Kendall:

It was not a question of pressure for conformity within JASON. There was no pressure for conformity at the level I operated at. There might have been some in choice topic. The group could look at a wide range of technical problems and, I believe, choose what to investigate. On the other hand, that did not necessarily mean under all circumstances the government would do what you wanted. In fact, it was not even true that under all circumstances the government would even listen to what you had to say. That was the government's choice.

Anyway, it became clear by 1973, at least in the area of reactor safety, that neither the regulatory agency, the industry nor the Congress were about to move toward a solution of all of this, and until the scandal over reactor safety became noxious and there was a big constituency in the public, there was nothing done.

But the long-term consequences of this controversy have been major changes. The Congress has now become totally skeptical about nuclear power. The Congress scrapped the AEC and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy after the stench of their behavior became apparent even to reluctant and obtuse observers. The industry has been backed into a corner, largely as a consequence of its own ineptitude and of improved public understanding of just what the nuclear proponents were doing that was not in the public interest. This took a very long time, a decade or more, to accomplish. There was a time around 1976 when we first began to appreciate the fact that the public perception of nuclear power was turning over (and the perception was correct (and got stronger and stronger. Of course, Three Mile Island in March 1979 helped that along, and it has been helped along even further by Chernobyl and the general dismal economic circumstances of nuclear power.

So at this point it's a derelict technology, and the work that the Union of Concerned Scientists did in opening that controversy is now largely completed, because the nuclear power problems are now well understood. It's a matter of public understanding and appreciation, and the Congress now reflects this new understanding.

Aaserud:

So UCS has made itself unneeded?

Kendall:

Well, it's not true that it's unneeded, but a lot of the work has certainly been done.

Aaserud:

In taking that different approach to advising on science related matters, to what extent did that involve or lead to controversies with earlier collaborators?

Kendall:

One collaborator, a nuclear engineering graduate student, pulled out when it was made clear to him he had no future in his field if he remained a critic. As far as JASON friends was concerned. Once I had left JASON, I had no professional contact with the people in the organization. For a long time, I think there was great skepticism over my views and UCS's views on nuclear power. People took a while to appreciate the truth of our conclusions, even in the scientific community, and there is a minority who never believed it and who do not to this day. But I think now there's a general appreciation of the nuclear troubles among most of my friends. A few people have come by and, in a gentle way, apologized for having misunderstood how deep were the ills of the technology. We were certainly correct, as events have proven, but it was a long time coming and people were somewhat reluctant to accept it for a long time. Some more than others.

Aaserud:

There's still a controversy about the insider (outsider approach.

Kendall:

I don't know that there is much controversy. In general, I think the limitations and the opportunities that an insider approach takes are well understood. And there's an understanding of the limitations and opportunities of and outside approach. There are some problems that can only be tackled largely by one or the other, although both are almost always necessary at some level.

The nuclear arms race will never be reversed or blunted until there is major public understanding and major public pressure to resolve things. But this can't be done totally by the outside critics. There have to be some insiders who can help keep the technical records straight, particularly in an area that involves national secrets, which the arms business necessarily does. But the government now over-classifies things. It continues to keep security wraps on matters which should not be kept secret. On this score, the continued presence of some insiders who are friendly to the public cause is critically important.

Aaserud:

Well, they're in a difficult position, of course. You're saying that there's not a complete divide between the insiders and the outsiders.

Kendall:

Well, I think it's difficult for people to play both roles although there are some that do, and very well, except for a few extraordinary individuals. Even then, it's not terribly easy to be effective in both places. But by and large, you need people inside and you need people outside, and you cannot really get away without both of them.

Aaserud:

But if I understood you correctly yesterday, your involvement in the Vietnam affair came, at least to some extent, from a dissenting attitude toward the government policy.

Kendall:

Yes, in a way it was dissenting. Certainly it was the feeling that the government did not really understand the nature of the problem. We were trying to help the government directly, initially. We worked with the government, and we got some response from the government, but not enough, and none whatever ultimately at the very highest levels. So it was a question more of trying to help the government than it was of dissenting in some way but later, as the ferocity of the war grew the dissent became more intense.

Aaserud:

And by hindsight, that may seem naive.

Kendall:

Well, it's certainly true that we didn't agree with the government's policy, but we felt, at first, that it was more a matter of ignorance on their part, and that some technical work and perhaps some technical innovation could be brought around that would alter the circumstance. But in the long term it proved that the government didn't want such things anyway, so the fixes were doomed to failure. But we did not know that at the outset.

Aaserud:

Let's turn now from the reactor business to other activities. I note that the current sheet of information on you from the Union of Concerned Scientists states three main areas of involvement by the Union (nuclear power safety, national energy policy, and nuclear arms control. Is that something that was defined from the outset, or was that something that has been defined later?

Kendall:

Well, nothing is defined at the outset, and nothing is sacrosanct anyway, the elements of our program are under continuous review. That is the circumstance that prevails today. In 1973, when we were not doing anything except nuclear power and there were only two of us, it obviously wouldn't have been the case that energy policy or nuclear arms were defined objectives.

We are involved in nuclear arms now because I've re-opened the subject in UCS. I've attempted to re-open it several times, and was ultimately and finally successful in 1981. It has grown as the opportunities have permitted it to grow. It has grown since then to be the major objective we have. We became interested in energy policy in the middle 1970s as a natural outgrowth of nuclear safety concerns, because the question obviously arose, if nuclear power were to be scrapped or greatly diminished, either by intent or by the result of accidents or faulty performance, what would the country do?

This question came up in the midst of the Arab oil embargo, with a huge rise in energy prices, particularly petroleum products, fuel shortages. There was a growing controversy over the use of fossil fuels aside from liquid fuel. We moved into this gap, and initiated a major study of national energy policy. We reviewed the potential contributions of the presently utilized energy sources, and did a review of the alternative energy sources (solar, wind, a great many of those (and we published a book on that subject.

Aaserud:

That effort was not as well covered in the media.

Kendall:

No, it was not as well covered in the media; that's correct. That's because it had been endlessly explored, during the environmental movement's opening days, from the late sixties though the seventies. We were essentially a somewhat minor contributor to that. And we did not have that much novel to say, either, just because the field was somewhat more mature by the time we got into it. We did not have the unique position in energy planning that we did in nuclear power.

Aaserud:

What was your major contribution in energy policy?

Kendall:

Well, a significant work product was the book. That got reasonable sales, and it allowed UCS to say correctly, that it did understand something about energy policy, and that we had a well thought out prescription for the energy future of the country. This all came in the midst of Nixon's push for energy independence, which was an ill thought-out, misfit program which eventually died under its own weight. It enabled us in talks on nuclear power to comment and criticize general energy policy, and to respond to the central question: if there is no nuclear power, what else? There's a good answer to that, and we have it, so it was worthwhile from our point of view.

Aaserud:

Solar energy?

Kendall:

Well, our prescription involved a combination of things, including solar energy; we carried out a fairly complicated evaluation, and set out a number of different scenarios, many of which would have been acceptable, and which involved a variety of different trade-offs. There was a big focus on increased efficiency of energy use, energy conservation, a slow transition out of liquid fuels, and so forth. At any rate, it's all in that book.

Aaserud:

Yes, Toward a Solar Future deals with solar energy in that broader sense.

In that activity, did you collaborate with other organizations with the same outlook?

Kendall:

No, we tended not to collaborate with other organizations very much, partly because there were not too many that worked at our level of technical skills, and partly because it gets too confusing and chaotic to try to work with other groups. We do now work with other groups on a collaborative basis (occasionally, and under fairly tight control. But in those days we did not, and it was a wise choice. Most of the groups in the environmental movement were technically not adequately informed, and frequently could not be moved off of what I think were poorly founded positions, so we tended to do our own work. But by the time that book was prepared, we had a technical staff and it was done in-house.

We also did a book on radioactive waste, which was a current issue of interest in the late seventies. I spent a lot of time on that. It did not get a huge public play, but it did result in testimony. It was a success, although not a runaway success.

Aaserud:

The last item on the list of concerns of the Union is nuclear arms control. That's the concern that you yourself consider the most important, and that's the concern that's certainly most active now.

Kendall:

I think that's correct. Of the technical issues we face, that is certainly among the most important or perhaps the most important.

UCS has by choice never spread itself among many issues. There are certainly many that we could tackle. In the very early days we did work in a variety of areas (the Clean Air Act and environmental pollution of one kind or another. We even did a study of meatpacking, as regulated by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. But we very quickly discovered (or I guess didn't even wait to discover, we just simply decided (that one should stick to a very limited number of issues. We have done that. Do a good job on just one or two. Nuclear arms is the crucial one, and so we've put a lot of effort into that over the years.

Aaserud:

Starting from the outset?

Kendall:

Well, starting at the outset, but then we dropped it for a very long period of time. In 1977 we tried to see if the public controversy could be re-aroused, with the various treaties under negotiation (the SALT II Treaty, and so forth. We did a Scientists' Declaration. We did another SALT Declaration and got a lot of support from the scientific community. Thousands of people signed our petitions.

But the time still wasn't right for public controversy on a large scale. That really didn't come about until the early eighties, after the Reagan campaign, in which there were charges by the Republicans and the Right Wing that we had become second best in nuclear arms and were vulnerable, and needed to build up nuclear arsenals. There was more than a little irresponsible talk by Reagan people on the winability of nuclear war and their interest in winning it. That gave us an edge to re-enter the controversy, and we did (in 1981, by organizing a national teach-in on nuclear arms, which was unexpectedly successful. It was the first big expression of public concern over nuclear war risks. We have had those annually since then. That was the first big break, and from then on it has been more and more successful.

Aaserud:

And then it was the ASAT involvement.

Kendall:

Well, that came considerably later.

Aaserud:

That was 1983.

Kendall:

That's correct. By then I had gotten Kurt Gottfried to come back on the board of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and we had been rearranging the staff and bringing on more experts. Kurt Gottfried took a leading role in introducing UCS into the ASAT business. That had been largely completed prior to Reagan's Star Wars speech. With an informed group and a publication and some skills in the area, when the Star Wars speech came, we were able to take a leading role, I think the leading role in the Star Wars debate. We have been the group that has established, to the satisfaction of the country as far as I'm concerned, that the scientific community broadly has no confidence in Star Wars. We wrote a book which has been our most successful book, The Fallacy of Star Wars, which sold something over 50,000 copies. That's now been re-written in a new version under a different name, and is coming out now just in a week or two. It is called Empty Promise: The Growing Case Against Star Wars.

Aaserud:

With new stuff?

Kendall:

With much new stuff in it, yes, brought entirely up to date.

Aaserud:

I would be interested in seeing that. In my view, it's more informative than the other one, partly, of course, because it's more up to date.

Kendall:

Well, the book Beyond the Freeze was up to date when it was written, but the Freeze having died, it's not very helpful to speak of "Beyond the Freeze"; there isn't going to be any "Beyond the Freeze" because there probably isn't going to be any Freeze. But that unfortunately was not our fault.

Aaserud:

To what extent do you consider the Union of Concerned Scientists as the voice of American scientists?

Kendall:

Well, I don't; it's not a general voice of American scientists. A voice only on very specific issues. First of all, the American scientists don't have a voice, and if they did, it would not make itself felt through an organization like Concerned Scientists. We don't work that way, and we don't aspire to be "the voice." What we do, we do as an organization. The UCS Board members, and senior staff propose, select and then support the generation of position papers on important topics (technical papers as on anti-satellite weaponry, Star Wars defenses, or doctrine of No First Use of nuclear weapons, or a comprehensive set of recommendations for what the country should do in the arms control area, for example. We may prepare a declaration with the help of a handful of the country's experts, and then we will go to the scientific community and ask for support for that statement, for that position. We frequently get overwhelmed by support in these cases and get thousands and thousands of scientists that sign on.

We do polls (sometimes ourselves and sometimes contracted out to a polling organization (to see what the scientific community thinks on various subjects. But the support we have from the scientific community comes specifically in the circumstances of some sort of document, for which we solicit supporters. And so on very selective issues, we get the support of the scientific community. On the Star Wars issue, we prepared a set of questions, and have a majority of the National Academy of Science, a majority of the country's Nobel Prize winners, supporting us on proposals to ban space arms and prevent an extension of the nuclear arms race into space. So that's the way we work.

Aaserud:

So it's not just a matter of getting more yeses than nos; it's a matter of getting a number of replies that you actually have an absolute majority for.

Kendall:

Well, that can be the case. Or sometimes we simply solicit signed support for a position paper. Then we publish the names or a selection of the names, saying that the following people support UCS's statement. We give the statement, and we give the supporter's name.

Aaserud:

To what extent have you encountered a problem with the point of view that the scientist, the academic in particular, should be objective and not concern him or herself with political questions?

Kendall:

You mean in their personal research or in their political feelings?

Aaserud:

I mean the general response of scientists to the Union of Concerned Scientists; have you had that kind of response?

Kendall:

There hasn't been any serious difficulty in that area. Many of the major problems facing the country, or facing humanity, have heavy technical components in them, and people including scientists, have opinions on these subjects, just like they have opinions on anything else. You know, some of us are Republicans and some of us are Democrats; some of us like to base the national security on lots of nuclear weapons and other people like to base it on a mix of nuclear weapons and intelligent doctrine and negotiated agreements with our purported enemy. My sense is that a majority of scientists support our views. But there are dissenters, and I don't think that anybody believe that scientific objectivity can lead to a single unique solution to the nuclear arms race, because it is not a scientific question. I have not found any new and startling dilemma there.

Aaserud:

But others may have.

Kendall:

Not to my knowledge. People disagree with us, but I don't think it's a dilemma that we shouldn't disagree, or that we shouldn't all by mysterious means reach a common understanding (and agreement on ends and means.

Aaserud:

But you might have been criticized for being a group of scientists having pretensions to more of an opinion than other people.

Kendall:

Well, there is a limited number of people who have said that, but there have not been very many, and I tend to discount its importance. We adopt issues that typically have important technical components and on these it is our aspiration to speak authoritatively.

Aaserud:

It's not been important enough so that you have been too concerned about this.

Kendall:

No.

Aaserud:

I guess that's my question.

Kendall:

I'm not really concerned about it at all. We are not concerned about that particular potential criticism. I think it is a fact of life in matters of public controversy that the critics have to prepare technically unassailable cases. I think that a technical blunder can be very damaging if not fatal, just from a practical point of view. I think people's scientific integrity has to be kept polished up, in working up technical cases in the public domain, because these cases are ransacked by people who are opponents and frequently enemies of what one wants to do looking for faults. A major blunder is going to prove very serious for public credibility, and opponents will never let you forget it.

We have made a very small number of errors (only one or two that I can think of in our whole history. In the nuclear power debate, I think we never made a mistake that ever caused us any significant grief. It's important to aspire to that, and take great care that they don't occur. Also overspeaking or making any attempt to stretch the limits of technical knowledge is not advisable. The scientific community is very sensitive to that and an organization can very easily lose its scientific supporters.

The government overspeaks, and so does industry, frequently and it's one of the facets of these controversies. But the government is, because of its position, able to ride out such mistakes. It can simply assert technical falsehoods (as we've discovered (when it knows better. But that is really not possible for the critics, at least not the Union to behave similarly. Truth is our most important commodity.

Aaserud:

Let's turn to the development in terms of numbers in the organization. What has been the development of the membership?

Kendall:

Well, first of all, there never was membership until after we incorporated. The drive for supporting members started when Daniel who was Executive Director, brought on a fund raiser to do public fund solicitation in-house. Then we started a direct mail campaign to get money from the public, and that's when we began to grow substantially.

Aaserud:

Was that at the time of the incorporation?

Kendall:

Well, it was not long after that, probably within six months or a year. Again, I don't remember the dates, but we brought on a very competent woman named Charlene Devokey who had been a fund raiser in the political system earlier. She came on the staff, and organized an internal direct mail division. That moved us away from dependence on angels, that is, people who could give us a few thousand dollars every now and then, and a handful of foundations that had supported us when we were in the ECCS hearing.

Aaserud:

What was your original basis of support?

Kendall:

Well, the basis of support originally was nothing, and we had the use of a xerox machine or mimeograph machine at the Audubon Society. The rest of us just worked at home, and would pay $60 for a reproduction fee or something of that sort. I mean, we were at that size for a while. And it just came out of people's pockets and spare time.

Then as the ECCS hearing proceeded, we had to have more money. We found some people, particularly one wonderful woman in New York, who basically fielded us. We're talking about a few thousand dollars, and then a few times ten thousand dollars, stretched over a year or two.

Eventually we had to pay (a lawyer, and we began to spend, not a few times ten thousand dollars, but many times ten thousand dollars, and got foundations to help us. But once we had incorporated and gotten the direct mail program, then we could look to having hundreds of thousands of dollars. I can't reconstruct an exact spending profile over the years, but once the direct mail started, we were able to expand.

We are not in that circumstance any more. We have stayed for two or three years now at roughly the three million dollar level. We're still growing, but it's not a very great growth rate at the moment. But it has grown more or less uniformly since the middle seventies till today.

Aaserud:

The incorporation was in the mid-seventies.

Kendall:

Yes.

Aaserud:

And the membership?

Kendall:

The membership's gone up along with the revenues.

Aaserud:

How has the increase in size affected the workings of the organization?

Kendall:

Well, no surprise there. We've become more complicated and more bureaucratic. It's somewhat more difficult to do things, but we're able to address larger problems and have more funds to bring to bear when we need to. We can afford to put on a satellite conference across the United States, and include Europe; we do that once a year. We've been able to afford to make movies, write books, support the travel of staff to various places, hold press conferences, and all our other various activities; our funds make that possible.

Aaserud:

Could point to any major changes over time?

Kendall:

Oh, we had a big bulge in our membership in 1980, 1981, 1982 (in that period (when the arms race became a major issue. We were the first group who could capitalize on the concern over nuclear arms and the risk of nuclear war. We had a big direct mailing (millions of pieces of mail soliciting membership. We had a big bulge in our membership then, and we have hung onto that, too.

We have a size and a set of resources, both intellectual and financial, that lets us capitalize on circumstances that are fast breaking. We can write an ad campaign in a week or so if we have to, and get major ads in, as we did over Three Mile Island. There was a big bulge of membership after Three Mile Island in 1979, although not as big as the arms race one later.

Aaserud:

You have been the chairman since the early seventies?

Kendall:

Yes, since the middle seventies. Since we had enough organization to be worthy of that name, I guess I've been chairman.

Aaserud:

What has been the development of the task and the duties of the chairman during the period of expansion?

Kendall:

I think it's just bigger and more complicated now; that's all.

Aaserud:

You haven't become a bureaucrat entirely.

Kendall:

I doubt it. No, we have a full time executive director and have had for ten years or more. He carries the brunt of the bureaucracy.

Aaserud:

If you were to place the Union of Concerned Scientists within the broader framework of (I shouldn't call it science policy, but the implications of science in society (do you consider it unique now? What organizations would you compare it to? What role does it play among others?

Kendall:

Well, there are not many organizations in the various areas that we deal in, at least not ones that are very nationally known and very effective. I think that in terms of size and scale, in the areas in which we have decided to concentrate heavily, we are certainly lead players, and I'm glad to report that. We certainly have had the lead role in the Star Wars controversy (and now many people in the Congress recognize that. We are not interested in science and social policy; we are interested in those social policies that have a heavy component of technology. It is that aspect that we in some sense are uniquely suited, to address, because the majority of the people that run UCS are scientists of one sort or another.

Our working mode has developed as one in which we do evaluations of major issues and make recommendations for public policy. We're not interested in science and public policy in the academic sense. We are trying to change the U.S. national defense posture, and it is a technical subject, in part. We have made ourselves competent to address that, and in doing so have separated ourselves from many other groups like the Sierra Club or others of that sort, who also have things to say about nuclear arms, but frequently don't say it with the competence and sustained investigation behind them that we try and put into it. So that's the difference.

Aaserud:

Where do you find your expertise for writing books or for testimony? Do you find it among the membership generally?

Kendall:

These are initiated within the UCS, usually at the board level. We ask people whom we know, whom we believe to be competent, to join us in that effort, but it's usually a small group of people. First of all, the general group that supports UCS is not drawn largely or intentionally even from the scientific community. The supporting membership of UCS (are drawn from the public at large. And on these technical studies we will have anywhere from three to half a dozen or nine or ten people involved. We pick them and ask them to join.

Aaserud:

Do you have any statistics on the division of membership?

Kendall:

It is not a membership organization in the sense which some organizations are, where members have a voice in policy and vote on issues placed before them. The board is in charge of the organization, and sets policy. There is some service to the membership in terms of newsletters, information available, and so forth, but basically they contribute the funds that keep us going. We also have a scientists program, about 7000, who take active roles in their local areas, and nationally, in representing UCS's views to the public and to elected officials.

Aaserud:

But certainly the division according to membership would show something about the reach of UCS.

Kendall:

Well, it turned out, when we first started reviewing the membership, that a larger fraction of them were scientists than we had thought. We haven't particularly solicited scientists, but have sought support from the general public. We mail several million pieces of mail a year across the country, in a broad-brush attempt to get support. The average donation is $33.00, and the aggregate provides the bulk of the money that we use.

Aaserud:

We were talking about the division of members, for example, physicists versus chemists or scientists versus non-scientists.

Kendall:

Most of our people are not scientists, but a fair number of them are, in the vicinity of 15 to 20%.

Aaserud:

Well, if we are to wind down, we should go from the specific to the more general again. I would like to ask you, do you see the emergence of the Union of Concerned Scientists as a sign of a new kind of concern, signifying a trend in that kind of involvement?

Kendall:

It may not be a trend, but there certainly is a new need for organizations of the UCS type. What we did in the reactor safety business was certainly, I believe, a major contribution. There are some who disagree with that, and who would have liked to have seen the nuclear power industry go ahead uncriticized and with its flaws left hidden. But in general I think it's best that that got out, and it took an organization (however, small it was at that time (to bring the facts out. We have long since developed quite satisfactory operating procedures for doing our work, and there has been no organization really like us before.

I think it is a model, and has proven so for some people. Many of the environmental organizations are now beginning to depend more and more on competent technical help. I think they were slow to realize the need and it was to their disadvantage. Now more and more they are getting Ph.D.s on their staffs, many group still depend on UCS for technical advice (which I find gratifying. We aspire to making an absolute minimum of mistakes as a precondition for continued effectiveness.

Aaserud:

Part of my general study concerns the role of the physicists in American science policy (excuse the expression (after the Second World War. Is the Union of Concerned Scientists kind of organization a sign that the involvement and impact of the physicist relatively has receded as compared to other groups in that respect?

Kendall:

What other groups have you got in mind?

Aaserud:

Physicists did play a very strong role after the Second World War.

Kendall:

They played a very significant role in Second World War. War World II was a physicists' war. World War I was a chemists' war.

Aaserud:

The inertia from that is what I'm talking about.

Kendall:

Well, rather than say the inertia, I would say the momentum. During and since WWII, the physics community was preeminently the one involved in developing not only weapons systems, but technical innovations of all kinds, including radar, computers, transistors and semiconductors. It's just a quite normal consequence of all of physics skills that the community would have had a lot to say about nuclear weapons, ASAT, space defenses and so forth.

Aaserud:

Which is still the case, of course.

Kendall:

Which is still the case.

Aaserud:

In those issues, I suppose, it's the physicists who still dominate in the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Kendall:

Well, to some extent that's correct, yes. That is the result of historical legacy, because I and my friends who have sustained the organization have been physicists.

Aaserud:

So the list of interests is partly a legacy of that.

Kendall:

Well, it's partly a legacy of that. It's partly a result of the fact that the problems posed by nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race involve a lot of physics. UCS has a considerable investment in skills in these areas. We have acquired a good reputation for the way we deal with them, and that is continuing.

Aaserud:

You have also been involved in a number of other committees and panels.

Kendall:

Not a great many. I tend to stay off those.

Aaserud:

Not all that many. It was I think mainly during the transition period, say in the late sixties and early seventies. Just a quick glance at the list shows the National Academy of Sciences, 1970 to 1971, the American Physical Society (

Kendall:

Well, I would put all of those in the category of being small operations; there's no particular importance for most of them.

Aaserud:

So in the area we're talking about you would emphasize JASON during the first period, and Union of Concerned Scientists subsequently.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

To the extent that we have been talking about your science policy involvements (for lack of a better expression (we have been covering the majority of it.

Kendall:

That's correct.

Aaserud:

Thank you.

Kendall:

Thank you.