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Oral History Transcript — Dr. Lauriston Sale Taylor

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Interview with Dr. Lauriston Sale Taylor
By Gilbert Whittemore
August 16, 1990

Transcript

Session I | Session II

Whittemore:

This is a continuation of the interview with Lauriston Taylor on August 16, 1990 and we are hoping to spend approximately an hour on the period after World War II. Maybe you could speak briefly about the situation after World War II, how the structure of the NCRP changed after World War II? I know it became much larger with establishment of subcommittees.

Taylor:

I believe it was in December 1946 that I guess I probably called together the members of the NCRP. I think they were all living at that time, all the ones who had been last active. We had a meeting. I think we invited in a couple of other people to that meeting; Iím not sure; itís probably in my records someplace but I donít know. These may have included Shields Warren of the AEC. It may have included Karl Morgan, but Iím not sure. But in any case, several things were clearly recognized.

One was that there was a whole new class of problems that were going to face the general public and radiation workers. New radiations as far as the public was concerned, a variety of radiations that were not known to exist before. I mean, the exact sources of them didnít exist, and so on. It was decided then to (1) continue the activity, (2) to broaden its base of coverage, and (3) to increase its membership in order to take advantage of the large growth in the number of people who now knew something about the problem. Before 1940, as I pointed out, there werenít very many.

We had all there were, but it wasnít very many. I guess at the same time — yes at the same time — we set up, Iím not sure now, 4 or 5 committees. One was a rather basic committee which dealt with basic aspects, but they called their committee one dealing with external radiation exposure, but the basic philosophy of the council under its new name and that constituted a committee under its new name. I lost myself.

Whittemore:

You were describing the different subcommittees, subcommittee 1 and subcommittee 2.

Taylor:

Subcommittee 1 covered really the basic aspects of biology and medicine both, radiation hazard. Committee 2 was a brand new one, because we had never before had to seriously consider anything about internal emitters, other than for radium, which we had already treated. And then there were several other committees which were continuations of prewar committees. That was pretty much it.

Whittemore:

Was this approximately the time Herman Muller was added?

Taylor:

I donít think so. In fact, Iím sure not. I donít know. Incidentally, Muller at that particular time was a sort of anathema to a lot of people, particularly the medical profession, because in his zealousness in promoting the genetic effects of radiation, he heavily condemned the medical profession for their careless use of radiation. Indeed, it was a somewhat justifiable claim, but at the same time, he had carried it to the point where he was really frightening people away from medical procedures.

So, my guess at the moment, is that it was probably two or three years, at least, later before he was brought in. In fact, the first person that was brought in to that was a Dr. Charles (sp?), from Rochester, I believe, the first geneticist. There may have been another one. Muller came in somewhat later, after. well, I suppose, increased recognition of the problem by the NCRP itself. It had in 1940, actually, pushed the idea of genetic effects, backed away from those somewhat in the late 1940ís, but it began to appreciate that it wasnít going to go away, so Muller was brought in.

Muller turned out, where he was in a club of people, among his peers, if you could describe anyone as being a peer of Muller, but they were his professional colleagues — among those people he toned himself down extensively, and actually became a very valuable member of the Council. As a result of his performance on the Council he was recommended somewhere along the line to become a member of the ICRP. He was a member of the ICRP for a number of years, also. Muller was a great guy, he was just — he had some kind of a horse to ride, and he was riding it too hard.

Whittemore:

Maybe you could talk briefly about the problems the ICRP had reestablishing itself, since many of its members did not survive the war?

Taylor:

Well, yes, the ICRP last met in this country in 1937, and there came the war in Europe. The chairman of that committee — no, the committee didnít have a chairman, it had a secretary. The carry over officer was a secretary. At each of the meetings an honorary chairman was appointed from the country in which the meeting was being held. This was most of the time sort of silly, because they frequently appointed somebody who was a topnotch physicist but not one who happened to know anything much about radiological physics.

So, the ball was kept in play by the secretary, and that was Dr. Kaye from Tethington. He was the one whom you may recall got me to do his recruiting for him back in 1928. When things came apart in Europe, he got in touch with me and asked me if I would act as secretary of the committee until further notice. Well, no further notice ever came, and I just stayed on. Kaye died; two of the people were liquidated by the Germans. — the German, Gustav Grossman, and Ezah Solomon, both Jews and both taken care of by the Germans. I donít know what happened to the others, but the only two survivors were Sievert from Sweden and myself.

Thatís sort of the way it stood. Incidentally, essentially the same thing happened to the ICRU. There were a few more survivors, but in the meantime I had been appointed by the ICRU back in the middle of the 1930ís to be secretary or chairman or something or other — secretary, I guess — of their executive committee, which was the carry-over. Well, without going into too much detail, the new president-elect — the person who was to be the next president of the ICRP — of the International Congress of Radiology — got in touch with me about one of the commissions, and I told him about that and the other one. That then resulted in a request from him to do something about reorganizing both of the groups. At the same time he asked Mainulard (sp?) from England to work with me on that. So, between the two of us, we put together these two new commissions.

They met for the first time as new bodies, with only one old body apiece, with a different structure. The ICRP increased its membership from six to twelve. This was to better represent the bigger field. The measurements committee, the ICRU, reduced theirs from a potential one hundred to also twelve, and the two commissions were set up with twelve members plus a chairman. I think I was secretary of both organizations when they were reorganized, and I stayed on, I think, as secretary of the ICRU — Iím not dead sure of titles — and I believe Maynard acted as chairman of the ICRP. We also did away with the old custom of having a chairman selected from the [host] country so, for all practical purposes, Maynard essentially became the chairman of the ICRP and I became chairman of the ICRU. Thatís approximately right — Iíd have to go back to the books on it.

Whittemore:

In the period after the war there was an enormous increase in the amount of research being done on biology and radiation, much of it funded by the AEC and some of it being done at AEC labs. I wonder if you could describe how it was that you yourself and others on the committee tried to keep abreast of all the work that was being done, especially unpublished work being done at the AEC facilities?

Taylor:

I think the way that we took care of that was by — letís take the NCRP. We enlarged the base of that and included in the membership people from a variety of organizations. We had two from the AEC. Those at the start were Morgan and Shields Warren. Warren was the Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine of the Commission. Morgan was chief of Health Physics, as it was then beginning to be called at Oak Ridge. We included Herb Parker, Iím not sure on what basis, particularly; he represented somebody, but he was from Hanford, so we had input from Hanford.

Herb Parker, incidentally, was one who really organized the health physics program as a physicist for the AEC. He did this for Compton and Bob Stone. Well, Iíd have to look at the names, but it increased the number of the NCRP from what had been a half dozen, roughly, to initially a dozen or so. That gradually increased. As we found we needed somebody who knew about reactor physics, we got somebody from reactor physics. As we needed, as we felt some area of coverage was open, we filled it. Well, we had our own professional exchanges; we knew about these people; we had lots of people we knew; through this we could get lots of good advice, and we did.

Another thing that was very important in that period was that the government bad not yet started to worry about conflicts of interest. I think to put that committee together today would have been a virtual impossibility, because somebody would have cited some conflict of interest for them or everybody that we could think of who would be useful, but that didnít happen in those days. The rule became, because the committee was small, that while a particular study would be carried about by a committee under a chairman designated by the NCRP, the membership of that committee did not have to be members of the NCRP as an organization.

They were members of that committee, but not of the NCRP itself. This further broadened our base of information, but didnít complicate us beyond credibility just by having too many people, because we stuck to the rule we had always had, that any report that was put out by the old Advisory Committee or the new NCRP, as a committee, any report had to be approved by the committee as such. That, incidentally, is followed out even till today, when the official number of members of the NCRP is seventy five. Any report that goes out today has to be submitted to seventy-five people for review and enough approval and little enough disapproval to be passed through, concluded.

Whittemore:

I wonder if you could talk about the decision that was made in the late 1940ís and early 1950ís to begin expressing limits in terms of an occupational dose and a general population dose, to try to establish a two-tiered set of limits? In particular, what your own opinions of that might be?

Taylor:

Well, the main thrust of interest had to do with occupational exposure. Just as you asked me, I was kind of racking my memory to know when we really began to talk about other exposures for the public, and Iím not sure I can remember. But my impression offhand would have been in the late 1950ís.

Whittemore:

I think there may have been some mention of it at one of the earlier meetings.

Taylor:

There probably was; there probably was. The general rule was that it would be a tenth of whatever we allowed for radiation workers. But, maybe as early as early as 1955 or 1956; it could have been mentioned before that; lots of things were mentioned, but, and never showed up for some time. Sorry.

Whittemore:

In the late 1950ís there were a number of other committees that were set up to study the issue of radiation exposure. One of those was the National Academy of Sciences Committee that was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. Could you recall when you learned of that committee and how you communicated and coordinated with it?

Taylor:

That committee reported out in 1956. I learned about it when it was set up by Bronk. Bronk talked to me, consulted with me almost, about some of the members they had on that. How did it coordinate with the NCRP? It didnít, period. It never coordinated with anybody. That was, the Academy committee didnít. For all practical purposes, the NCRP didnít know it existed. We did, of course, know it existed, because it had at least four NCRP members on it, so we knew what was going on. This is unfortunate, but itís the way that the Academy committee has operated in a number of areas — I donít know in general — that it has operated in several areas in the radiation area in that way. They just kept things close from any outside organization.

Its rather interesting because one outcome of that occurred in 1946 [1956]. They issued their first BEAR [Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation] report in summer or spring, June or sometime, 1946 [1956]. Failla was either a member of that committee or had been consulted about it - anyway, he was thoroughly familiar about what went on. There was general knowledge about the committee existing, but nobody knew what they were doing. Failla did.

There was a meeting of the ICRP in the spring of 1946 [1956] and Failla told the ICRP about the report and the fact that they were probably going to propose a reduction in the permissible dose for radiation workers, changing it from 3/10 of an r per week to 5 rems per year. So, after about half an hourís debate, the ICRP said if the Academyís going to do it, weíd better do it first, and they did. They had this information and they wrote it into their report and made this available publicly before the Academy did. However, basically, the whole support for it was out of the Academyís report.

Whittemore:

Do you recall whether was there a move within the NCRP for such a reduction before the Academy report?

Taylor:

No, before the Academy committed there was none. What little we knew about what the Academy was doing was just information. No, the NCRP did not do anything about it until that fall. Then it met, it agreed with that number because it was the sort of thing the NCRP had been discussing, not very seriously, but it had been discussing, so that after the Academy report was out the NCRP simply said fine, weíll accept it. They took the further step of introducing a formula that would allow people to sort of use up a radiation exposure reserve.

They introduced a concept that any radiation worker would be allowed to receive up to 5 rem in a year for every year of his age over 18. In other words, if he was 18 or 19, he would get 5 rem. If he started work at 21, he presumably would have two or three years of credit which he didnít actually earn. That particular limitation, which was picked up by the AEC and the NRC, is only very recently been dropped. It was dropped by the NCRP and the ICRP some years ago, but the government has continued using it. Personally, I think it was not a bad idea, because I think that, in terms of some of the need, thereís been an overstress on some of these exposure limitations.

Whittemore:

Was there much discussion at that time as to how records would be kept of radiation workers? I know there was some discussion of people using up their exposure limit at one job and simply switching employers.

Taylor:

The NCRP, I donít think, ever got into that. Thatís the way it was used, and it was actually abused sometimes. The final compromise on that, Iím not sure when that came, was to limit the yearly exposure to fifteen rems. Thatís right, they limited it to fifteen rems for transient workers or people who might be starting late and accumulated, you might say, a credit. The fifteen rem figure was chosen primarily because under the 3/10 r per week that would add up to about 15 rem in a year.

That had been allowed for some years, before theyíd changed to five, so stick with it. The AEC, however, changed that slightly. They simply divided the fifteen by four and came up with whatever a fourth of fifteen is — 3 and 3/4 or something like that. Gradually, that was such a nonsense kind of a number, that they dropped it to twelve rem per year so that they could get 3 rem per quarter. I think itís only within, if the new part 20 is fully in effect now, itís just something thatís happened within the last matter of weeks. At that time, there also was some discussion as to how to figure in medical irradiation as part of a personĎs budget for exposure.

Whittemore:

Do you recall any discussions about the lack of medical records?

Taylor:

Oh, there were discussions, but I donít think that was ever seriously treated. It was discussed. I think maybe — probably somewhere we said if people had to have extensive medical treatment they should go easy on industrial radiation and the other way around. That part was discussed, but I dont recall it ever having been proposed in any serious way.

Whittemore:

Was there a sense in this time period on the part of the medical profession that was part of the NCRP, that the focus was now shifting almost entirely to atomic energy concerns?

Taylor:

Before the war, the medical exposure was the only area of problems. The medical profession really had mixed feelings on that. In some parts of the medical profession they were kind of relieved that the heat was off of them and on to industry. Others in the medical profession were concerned because they were paying so much attention to industry, they were not giving enough attention to medicine.

Actually, thereís been, I think, a rational, a reasonable and rational, balance of professional input on each of those scores. The medical profession themselves through actions of the College of Radiology and so on did a great deal to impress their members with the necessity for protection. I think in the early days, they might have sort of scoffed at it some, but in the later days, certainly beginning in the mid 1950ís, they took it much more seriously.

Whittemore:

Was the involvement of manufacturers of medical radiating devices as intense as it had been before the war?

Taylor:

No, not really. There had always been a couple of people in the X-ray equipment industry tied in someplace; there had always been, a committee on medical radiation exposure, primarily for the workers but also relating to patients in some cases. Thatís all I can think of there at the moment.

Whittemore:

I know that before the war they would sometimes write to you with very specific new devices they had come up with.

Taylor:

Oh, yes. Before the war there was close collaboration. Before the war, there was all manner of close collaboration between industry and the Committee, industry and the Bureau of Standards, for example. We were honest people in those days; at least nobody thought we were crooks, or assumed that we were crooks. I think a good deal of that gradually disappeared just under political, Congressional type inquisitions, almost, at times — conflict of interest.

There was some collaboration — there had to be — with industry, in many different directions, of course, now that the nuclear industry was open. There are cases that noticeably were not considered by the NCRP in those days. For example, they would not become involved, let us say, with some of the problems to do with nuclear reactors, except for the degree to which they might cause radiation exposure someplace, but never any other, anything that could be interpreted as a ďposition." Another committee that was formed at that time was one which I believe you were on, or attended some of their meetings. That was the Public Health Serviceís National Advisory Comittee on Radiation.

 

Whittemore:

What can you recall, particularly about the founding of that committee?

Taylor

Yes. Well, this was the one back about 1957, along in there someplace. Yes, I got myself badly bitten by that committee in one place. That was largely in reaction to fallout problems. The general idea was to set up some kind of a program for keeping track of fallout and warning the public, introducing various monitoring requirements and radiation monitoring networks. There was substantial amount of iodine, for example, from the testing that was coming down in various parts of the country and getting into the milk system, just as one.

That was the most important one because, one, it would get into the milk quickly by the cow eating the grass, and the milk being generated and kept for a short time, and then fed to people, children, and so on. There is no question that that was an important problem. It was largely to consider questions of that sort. Well, I was a member of that committee for two terms, I guess - the first and second term, whatever that meant, now I donít recall. But it kept on for a number of years, and gradually worked itself out of a job, which is what committees of that sort should do.

You mentioned you had been badly bitten by it once. I was badly bitten because it turned out that those meetings were being recorded and transcribed and copies made available to the public. A lawyer in a court case against the government, where I was trying to defend the position of the government, they ran into some chatter there between the two of us. I donít remember exactly what it was, but I was just sort of speaking jokingly off the cuff about some of the attention we were giving to this problem, and it was interpreted by and presented to the jury — or the court, rather, in this instance — as an example of my callousness towards radiation.

Whittemore:

Was this court case back in the 1950's?

Taylor:

No, this court case was in the late 1970ís or early 1980ís. Its been in a number of court cases since. They bring up the same damní question. They go back and read about it in one, and they try it in the next.

Whittemore:

One other committee that was founded at that time was the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

Taylor:

Yes.

Whittemore:

Again, I was wondering if you had any recollections of both its founding and whether the NRP was aware of it?

Taylor:

Oh, yes. The NCRP was certainly aware of it, keenly aware of it, but had nothing to do with it.

Whittemore:

Was there any overlap of membership?

Taylor:

Lots. Yes. In the 1950ís Sievert from Sweden was one of the really active people in the radiation protection field. Sievert not only had good financial support from his organization, but he was also wealthy himself, and used a lot his own money in promoting things. He had a grand program set up for making the ICRP a recognized body between governments. This was enjoyed by everybody but the ICRP. They didnít want any part of it, but he was convinced that something of that sort was needed. I donít remember any more of the details of it, but I remember at the time, because I had many meetings with Sievert and others on that general subject.

I think itís largely because of Sievertís effort and that of the Swedish delegation that they set this UNSCEAR up. It turned out to be a very effective and useful organization. A lot of overlap between what it does and what the National Academy of Sciences does and what the NCRP does. There was an abundance of overlap between them. Sometimes, itís hard to know whether thatís good or bad. It certainly is time consuming. But, it works; two of the present members of UNSCEAR one of them is the current president of the NCRP and another of them is Pykoff (sp?) , and Rossi, who are members of the NCRP and corresponding members of the ICRP are in there, too.

Whittemore:

In the late 1950ís there is some indication of slight differences between NCRP and ICRP recommendations for internal emitters, allowable concentrations of different isotopes. I wonder if...

Taylor:

Well, not really. The internal emitter problem got to be an awful mess because that was under the chairmanship of Morgan in both cases. He was chairman of the ICRP internal emitter committee and also the NCRP committee. There was maybe a fifty percent overlap of membership between the two committees. But the difficulty was that Morgan had some ideas of his own and he couldnít necessarily get the committee to go along with them. He would try writing in his own ideas, and it would come back to the committee and get taken out because it was opposed here or there. This got to the point where it was so bad — well, a report was issued in, gosh, 1960?

They issued one in 1949; the next one came out in — I donít remember the exact one — never mind, it came out about 1960. The two reports were, in that case. both prepared, one by Morganís NCRP committee and the other by Morganís ICRP committee. There was no technical difference between the two reports. But what did happen in there, was that for the first time the Director of the Bureau of Standards became concerned that this committee, over which the Bureau had no direct control, but for which it apparently was the father or parent or something, was getting into areas of concern which were not within the area of competence of the Bureau of Standards, and that was correct.

For a while, thatís the first time there was ever a balk at publishing an NCRP report. It was only approved, finally, after we had communicated with the chairman of the ICRP and the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, saying that they did not object to its being published. But at the same time, a great deal of the discussion that went into the ICRP report was just not included in the NCRP report. Basically they were the same, but the NCRP report had been rather emasculated. Well, then, there were problems as far back as 1950 with Morgan, and what he wanted as against what his committees wanted.

I wonít go into that other than to indicate that there was a modest amount of professional friction. Finally — and Iím not sure of the date again, I think it was about 1969 — the NCRP just felt that it couldnít carry Morgan any further as chairman, and so he was removed as chairman, and the whole committee essentially went into a sort of limbo at that time. The ICRP ended up by doing the same thing, either at that meeting or the next meeting, as the NCRP had. In other words, he was just removed from both of them, because he just wouldnít be guided by his committee.

Whittemore:

Did the differences stem from the kinds of models used to calculate?

Taylor:

Oh probably. I couldnít possible tell you where they came in. Morgan had general ideas about radiation exposure that you might describe as being more severe than most. Thatís one way of saying it, I guess. He wasnít the only one. We had people running in both directions; either they were too severe, or they weren't severe enough. However, a good chairman does what his committee does. That wasnít working.

Whittemore:

I wonder if you could recall the founding of the Federal Radiation Council and how that came about, because I know there were several different versions of what the council should look like and consultation with you on its final form ?

Taylor:

There were a wide variety of things. I was personally very much involved in that. Well, in the first place, at one of the Congressional hearings, I donít know, 1957, 1958, somewhere along in there, Hollifieldís committee suddenly realized, and brought out, that the government itself had no organization of its own that was set up to pass on the radiation standards that the government was following, that the NCRP was the only one — at that time they didnít even bother about the ICRP — the NCRP was the only one and the government had no control over it. It was that, that led to the demand on the part of, I think, Hollifleldís committee that some kind of government committee be set up.

Attempts were made to take over, or proposals, at least, were made to take over the NCRP and let that be it. That didnít happen, of course. I donít remember the variations, but it was finally decided in 1959 that they would have a committee set up under Executive Order, made up of representatives from each of — and they named a bunch of the government departments — and it would have a small permanent staff, and the staff would be paid for by money extracted from the various departments, which, of course, no department liked. This started some further rumpus, because there was a proposal of an Executive Order on this, and then, also, Congress felt they had to have a hand in it too, so they set up a bill to handle it. That story was one of the really amusing ones. At the time that was adopted — this was in the summer, July 1959.

I can remember it well because I happened to be in Munich at that time, attending meetings of the ICRU and ICRP. I had been invited to go up to Rennep in the Ruhr area to give the dedication lecture for a new Roentgen Museum that being established there. The Germans did it in a fine way. They set up two special cars on the train from Munich to Dusseldorf with various German notables and myself and a few others. Sleeper up and gave the talk and that evening had a big dinner at some restaurant; Iím not sure where the restaurant was, Rennep perhaps, but anyway, it was right after the meeting. As we were leaving a voice suddenly came calling out of the place, ďPaging Doctor Taylor.Ē I called, ĎWhat do you want?Ē ďThe White House is calling you.Ē Wouldnít mean anything to me. Anyway, I went in and this voice over the phone.

I canít think of his name now, he was a professor from Harvard [Kistiakowsky] and his name will come to me but he was one of the planning group for this and he was calling from the White House. Of course, if anybody ever calls up, even to ask the time of day, they always say ďThis is the White House.Ē Well, anyway he talked, and then he said, ďIf you recall, you were promised that any final executive order to establish the radiation council, weíd clear it with you before it was released.Ē Well, I had been told that, but hadnít paid much attention to it, but they did, and thatís what they were calling me for. They read the essence of it, and I said fine and went on about the business. Well, my own position in that crowd of people after the ďPresidentĒ had called me was really something; it was just a big wild rumpus. So I know how it was set up.

Whittemore:

In the years after that, how much coordination was there between the Radiation Council and the NCRP?

Taylor:

It varied. There was a fair amount. There was none officially. They set up a committee to review what needed to be done. It was almost one hundred percent NCRP people. The NCRP was informed about what was going on, probably had some input, but it didnít need any, because its key people were already there doing this. It set up a series of recommendations which adopted all of the then existing permissible dose standards but one. That met for six months or so, that particular committee, as a full time working committee, almost. That also was rather interesting because, in the meantime, I was an unofficial member of the Federal Radiation Council — sorry, of the Working Group. The chairman of that was Allen Astin, the Director of the Bureau of Standards.

I could not be a member of it, because of conifict of interest, but I was taken along by Allen Astin to keep him fed with the necessary radiation information because he was not a radiation-oriented person. He did a good job, more or less. When that finally was finished, Astin dropped away from it. I actually became a member of the Working Group. I donít know how he solved that conflict of interest problem. But then, as a member of that Working Group, not NCRP, I was with the chairman of the Working Group when it presented to Mr. Fleming, who was then head of whatís now Health and Human Services, I donít know what it was called in those days — Health, Education and Welfare, I guess. We went through these things with him, and their report was accepting all but one.

Fleming said, ďHow does it happen that on this one, youíve adopted a number which is different from the NCRP and also from the ICRP. They were the same. How does it happen that youíve adopted all of those, but here youíve adopted a new number. Whatís your basis for this?Ē Well, it was comical, because the chairman of that group, then was a man from the Public Health Service, the secretary of the Working Group, kind of fiddled and faddled around and finally he said, ďWell, it just didnít look right to adopt everything of the NCRP, so we made a change in this one.Ē

Fleming blew up like dynamite. ďI hope I never hear another excuse like that again. Unless you can give me some good solid biological reason for making the change, you put that back to agree with the NCRP.Ē That was the end of that study. So there was lots of interplay through there. This on the whole was, I think, pretty reasonable and healthy, although annoying at times. There it is.

Whittemore:

I wonder if you ó this may have been after you left the NCRP — the point at which the Federal Radiation Council was transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency, whether you have any recollections of that?

Taylor:

Oh, I have recollections of it, and I had some discussions, a number of discussions with, gosh, the first head of the EPA, whose name is also gone. Kistiakowsky was the name of the person who called me from the White House — Kistiakowsky from Harvard. I thought there would be some close coordination between the NCRP and the EPA, and that was because of the personal ties and background of whoever this person is, whose name I canít think of. Met with him, and things were cordial and so on, but when that got set up, the organization itself, it began to look, in my opinion, rather hopeless.

It was more concerned with doing something that was different, doing something that was more restrictive. I had the impression that they were trying to make a name for them as a new environmental organization put together by active environmentalists and so on, more a feeling that that was their concern rather than anything else, and I simply lost track of it. What little I had to do with it never made me very happy so I quit having anything to do with it.

Whittemore:

Our time is almost up. Maybe we could end if you could just briefly describe the materials youíve deposited in countway Library as a kind of archive.

Taylor:

Oh, boy.

Whittemore:

Or just the types of materials.

Taylor:

Well, the library originally asked essentially for all of my books and papers and records and so on. This was done under a Doctor Lloyd Haus, who unfortunately has since died. However, my stuff is still going there. What Iíve sent there is part of my collection of X-ray tubes, I donít know how many — thirty tubes — oh, it must be more than that, thirty, forty or fifty tubes. I still have a dozen or so, as you see, here at home that will go to them. They were planned to go this summer, but havenít gone.

I also have a fairly extensive collection of early X-ray instruments, and that has mostly gone. I still have a few of those that I keep for old timeís sake. A series of certain journals, I donít remember specifically which ones, but my whole library has not gone, as you see, but will go — all the technical books. A series of my personal books, my personal biography, which we talked about the other day a little.

Whittemore:

Also there are the NCRP and ICRP archives.

Taylor:

Oh, yes, for heavenís sake. Thatís about it. All of the early records of the ICRP and the NCRP, essentially up until last year. That, incidentally, made a small problem which has been solved satisfactorily with both the ICRP and the NCRP. They didnít like the idea of their papers, many of which involve correspondence and reports and a variety of things of the types that went through my hands — itís only material that went through my hands that goes there. So they have put a ten year embargo on stuff that goes there. Stuff sent up in 1990 cannot be looked at from the outside for ten years after that.

This is just to protect the people. So it includes all of the very earliest papers of both the NCRP and the ICRP. Probably the only — I just donít know of anybody else that has any of the early NCRP papers. The one person who had some of the early ICRU papers — oh, yes, the ICRU is included in this. The person who had the early ICRU papers died; nobody knows what happened to the papers. I have essentially everything from the NCRP and ICRP. Do you think of anything else?

You know almost as much about it as I do. Those are the main things that I think of. Among other things that will be going up there will be, for example, a complete set of all of the International Congresses of Radiology abstracts and proceedings and so on. It represents about eight feet or so of shelf space; I doubt that you would find that collection anywhere else. Odds and ends of that sort. That's about it.

Whittemore:

Thank you very much.

Session I | Session II