Number 693 #3, July 22, 2004 by Phil Schewe and Ben Stein
Defending Networks Against Cascading Failure
Just as foresters can often halt a forest fire from burning out of
control by deliberately setting firebreaks, it might be possible to
reduce the size or spread of outages in a network in the wake of an
attack or overload. The Internet and the electrical grid are just two
such networks that might benefit from a new model devised by Adilson
Motter of the Max Planck Institute for the Physics of Complex Systems
in Dresden. Several previous network models have shown how an attack
on key nodes of a system can cascade into a catastrophic failure. Motter's
model shows how such a failure can be mitigated by shutting down selected
peripheral nodes that handle only small amounts of the network's total
load. Simulating attacks on networks showed that answering the original
attack with several successive rounds of precautionary node shut-down
drastically reduced the size of the overall cascade. (Physical
Review Letters; motter@mpipks-dresden.mpg.de)