Independent Scientific Panel Advocates Dual Strategy for Plutonium Disposal
The “US-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,” co-chaired by John Holdren in the US and Evgeniy Velikhov in Russia, released its final report on September 10. The Commission, comprised of independent Russian and American scientists, incorporated as its basis the “dual-track” strategy announced by the US Energy Department in December 1996 and endorsed by Congress in the FY 1998 DOE appropriations conference report (see FYI #124 ): disposing of surplus weapons plutonium both by converting it into a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for burning in reactors, and/or immobilizing it by vitrification with highly radioactive wastes in glass logs.
The Commission repeatedly emphasizes the urgency of this mission. “Speed in proceeding,” it states, “is critical both for minimizing vulnerability of the material to theft and for signaling promptly the seriousness of US and Russian commitments to remove the plutonium permanently from weapons use.” It calls for expanded cooperation among the US, Russia, and other countries with relevant expertise, and notes that one of the biggest obstacles may be sufficient funding: “The problem of funding is particularly acute in Russia, where badly needed activities are being delayed by lack of money.” It suggests that “work begin now on pulling together an international cooperative approach to financing plutonium disposition, particularly in Russia.” The Commission’s report (33 pages with annex) gives a series of recommendations and provides an outline and timetable for implementation. The recommendations are summarized below, with selected quotes.
A. Overall Approach:
With support from the international community, the US and Russian governments “should take additional steps...to more rapidly reduce the security risks posed by excess weapons plutonium” by accelerating work on storage and transformation into less-risky forms (using as a standard the spent fuel typical of a commercial reactor.) Both of the dual-track approaches - burning as MOX fuel in reactors and vitrifying in glass logs - should be brought to large-scale operability “as rapidly as practicable in both countries.” According to the report, “These are the surest, least costly, and potentially fastest ways to achieve the spent-fuel standard.... Reactors suitable for using MOX fuel exist in both countries... [and] both countries also have well developed programs for immobilization of radioactive wastes in glass. The two approaches should be pursued in parallel to provide insurance against encountering unforeseen obstacles to the large-scale utilization of either one...”
The highest standards of protection must be applied during storage, processing, and transportation until the spent-fuel standard is reached. Both countries must exchange more information on inventories of nuclear materials and progress toward reduction, and their programs should continue to proceed in parallel, seeking reductions to comparable quantities in similar time frames. “Increased funding should be provided on an urgent basis” for development and deployment of the disposition systems.
B. Storage, Protection, Control, and Accounting:
The US and Russia should continue cooperation on improving security, storage and accounting. The report recommends provision of sufficient funding to complete construction of storage facilities and modernize security systems in Russia, and suggests that “the resources committed to this cooperative work should be increased by at least 50 percent above the 1996 levels.” Both countries should “move quickly to implement and expand on the reciprocal information exchanges and mutual inspections.” The US and Russia should work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium are “placed under international safeguards as quickly as practicable.” Russia should, as the US does, begin declaring specific quantities of nuclear materials “excess,” and both countries should seek to make additional materials eligible for IAEA safeguards as a step towards increased international transparency and trust.
C. Disposition of Excess Plutonium:
The US and Russia should promptly select and bring to operability the variants of both the dual-track approaches that will be used in each country. This includes gaining the cooperation of the executive and legislative branches of government in authorizing and funding the necessary activities, and preparing the nuclear regulatory agencies to review and license the needed facilities. The two countries should establish individual and joint management structures “to be responsible to the presidents for carrying out this work to specified endpoints on a specified timetable. To leave this program at the mercy of the distractions and competing priorities within existing bureaucratic structures,” the report says, “is to ensure that too little will be accomplished, too slowly.” Both countries should “expedite and expand” their technical cooperation for preparing plutonium forms for disposal and using MOX fuel in currently operating reactors, and for vitrifying plutonium with radioactive wastes. Along with the international community, they should “begin now to address the largest obstacle to progress on plutonium disposition beyond interim storage, which is financing and constructing adequate capacity in the two countries for processing plutonium pits into plutonium oxide and for fabricating plutonium and uranium oxides into MOX fuel.” The report estimates that “large investments will be needed to provide these facilities - in the range of one billion dollars - which Russia in particular will not be able to finance on its own. A plan should be developed and implemented for international cooperation in financing the needed facilities in Russia.” (A suggested option is borrowing against future sales of Russian blended-down highly enriched uranium.)
Both countries should seek contracts with MOX fabrication facilities in Europe till such facilities are developed in the US and Russia. “Because of the urgency of proceeding with disposition to the spent-fuel standard,” the US and Russia should plan to begin their programs using currently operating reactors,” the report advises. “Waiting for new reactors to be built...would be a recipe for intolerable delay.” However, they should also continue developing technologies for higher loadings of MOX fuel and use in additional reactors. US and Russian nuclear regulatory agencies “should be directed - and funded - to develop procedures” for prompt review and licensing of necessary facilities. Both countries should end additional production of weapons plutonium, and they should begin discussions toward “a formal agreement governing plutonium disposal.” Such an agreement, the report says, “may help ensure funding stability: legislatures in both countries are more likely to provide necessary funding if that funding is needed to fulfill an international commitment.”
The “Final Report of the US-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium” can be obtained from OSTP (202-456-2894), and will soon be available on their Homepage: www.whitehouse.gov/OSTP.html
