Energy Secretary Richardson on Securing the National Labs

“I need your help,” Energy Secretary Bill Richardson told the National Research Council Governing Board last week as he outlined the implementation of new procedures to secure the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories. Referring to “misguided legislation” that would close these labs to visitors from sensitive countries, Richardson told the board that “we should do nothing to curtail scientific exchange.” Portions of his prepared remarks follow:

"...in the name of protecting our nation’s nuclear secrets, some are proposing to end our cooperation with some of the finest scientists in the world. Instead of strengthening our nation’s security, this proposal would make it weaker.

Since becoming Secretary of Energy, I have made it my priority to better safeguard the nation’s nuclear secrets. That has meant strengthening the physical protection of our facilities, enhancing personnel security, and increasing counterintelligence expertise to better identify potential problems, potential targets and potential spies. These measures will help ensure that what we fear has happened will not happen again. We want the unclassified areas of our labs to remain open to scientific inquiry, but that does not mean we are not taking precautions, strong ones. Our counterintelligence budget has increased 15- fold since 1996.”

"...yesterday [May 11, 1999] I announced the most sweeping reform of security programs in the Department of Energy’s history, which will enhance our ability to detect security infractions, correct institutional problems and protect America’s nuclear secrets.

“We can collaborate on an international scale to advance science and safely protect our national secrets. It is in our national interest to do both. The best way to accomplish this is through tight security and strong counterintelligence efforts. That is what we are doing.

“When the classified areas of our national labs are properly secured, cooperation with foreign scientists can be conducted safely. We do not engage in this cooperation because we can, but because it is in our national interest to do so.

“The strength of the programs that support our nuclear arsenal is in the quality of its broad scientific base, which is at the heart of our efforts to maintain our weapons without nuclear testing. If we isolate our scientists from the leaders in their fields, they will be unable to keep current with cutting-edge research in the disciplines essential to maintaining the nation’s nuclear deterrent.

“Let me give you one example. Some of the best atomic physics codes - unclassified codes about the detailed structure of atoms - are written abroad. This work is pursued openly at universities around the world. Hundreds of the best atomic physicists around the world work to test and improve these codes, which the scientists at our labs then adapt to support classified nuclear weapons work. Cutting off the flow of this specialized information - not letting our scientists work with their academic colleagues - will inevitably deprive us of the best science to support our work.

“The potential for long-term consequences is even more troubling. Isolating our scientists from international expertise would make it even more difficult to attract leading young scientists to our laboratories, which is critical to the viability of the nation’s nuclear weapons program. This concern was stated strongly in the report of the Chiles Commission, established by Congress to recommend ways to ensure the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.

“How are we going to attract today’s best talent if they know that they will be left behind, isolated from their peers in U.S. universities and other countries, cut off from the best minds in their disciplines?”

“Scientific genius is not a monopoly held by any one country.” “Cutting off our international work would harm America’s security in other ways. Our labs are home to the leading experts in the protection of nuclear weapons. We send them abroad, to where their expertise is needed. In Russia, they are helping secure hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from theft by rogue states or terrorists.”

“Employees of our Department of Energy are installing detection devices at airports in Russia to prevent nuclear smuggling. Our lab employees are securing and stabilizing spent nuclear fuel in North Korea to prevent that country from restarting its nuclear weapons program. We are keeping ex-Soviet weapons scientists employed at home in the service of peace so that they aren’t forced by poverty into the weapons programs of Iraq or other rogue regimes.

“All of this work would grind to a halt if a foreign visit moratorium was implemented.

“If we follow those who propose that we isolate our labs from the world, we will weaken our national defense, cripple our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and undermine the science that underpins our national security. In the end, we would damage the very security we seek to protect.”

In responding to questions after concluding his address, Richardson was asked if there were any provisions in legislation now being considered that were acceptable to him. His response was negative: “I think it would hurt our national security...I don’t want those restrictions... I am not going to overreact.”