Science Committee Hearing on the International Space Station
The House Science Committee held a 2 1/2 hour hearing last week to get an update on the International Space Station (ISS). As expected, committee members did not like what they heard, and, probably, the witnesses did not like what they had to report. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the outlook suggests no major change in course -- at least, not yet.
The major problem bedeviling the space station is the Russian government’s failure to pay its share of the ISS cost. While all parties hope that situation will be corrected, attention seems to be shifting to how funding shortfalls should be made up. Office of Management and Budget Director Franklin Raines submitted a statement for the record in which he declared, “If additional resources are needed for Station development, we will look for offsets within NASA while protecting our priorities in space and earth science, advanced space transportation, and aviation safety research. We will look for offsets first from within the $6 billion spent annually on [the] human space flight account, as long as it does not compromise Shuttle safety, and second from other non-priority areas. And, in order to build this Station at the lowest total cost, reductions in or offsets for other Station activities such as operations, research, and later assembly hardware, may be necessary.”
This does not sit well with committee chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Ranking Minority Member George Brown (D-CA). Sensenbrenner expressed disappointment that OMB proposes making up the shortfall by taking money from other NASA budgets, calling it “frankly unacceptable.” Brown, in his opening statement, said “I want to make it clear that I do not believe that NASA’s other important programs should be robbed to pay for the Space Station’s cost growth. This is not an acceptable solution.” Sensenbrenner asked OSTP Associate Director Duncan Moore where this money would come from; Moore replied that while the Human Space Flight Account is the likely source, the exact accounts have not yet been determined. Sensenbrenner promised to revisit the issue with Moore and the new director of OMB at a mid-June hearing. This is around the same time that NASA Director Daniel Goldin promised to have an agency reaction to the Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force report (see FYI #75 .)
The administration and Congress are in a predicament that they cannot seem to find their way out of. Goldin said he was “very frustrated and angry with the leadership in Russia...they’ve got to deliver...we cannot have this relationship.” “The Russians are at a turning point,” he said, adding that they have to decide if they want to be a partner in the ISS program. Committee members pointed out that Russia just completed an 823-foot-long warship estimated to have cost around $1 billion. “The Russians can afford what they want to afford,” one member stated.
As angry as Goldin is, he is not ready to break-off the relationship with the Russians. Telling the committee that he once worked on weapons of war to be used against Russia, he said it would be a bad signal to cancel the agreement. “I do know how to let go,” he said, “somehow, someway...we’ve got to find a solution.” Raines, in his prepared statement, declared, “If we were to decide to completely divorce ourselves from this Russian partnership, it could cost us billions of dollars. We do not believe this will be necessary.”
Sensenbrenner offered some recommendations at the hearing’s conclusion. “We have a challenge...on were to go from here,” he said, urging NASA to make clear its needs before appropriations bills are drafted. He was upset that OMB declined to send a witness to his hearing, saying “OMB must be an active participant in the solution of this problem.” It is not good strategy to upset a committee chairman, particularly one who favors your program. He also said that there has “got to be a credible plan to deal with Russian failures” to deliver on schedule. Sensenbrenner is also concerned about a further slip in a decision on what to do about a key component.
“The way I see it our problem is very simple,” Sensenbrenner said. “We can stick our heads in the sand, put on a happy face, and hope nobody will notice the delays and cost overruns. (I think this is highly unlikely.) Or we can admit mistakes, move on, and work together - Republicans and Democrats, Congress and the White House, industry and NASA, the U.S. and its international partners (especially Russia) - to get the station built.”
