APS Science Policy Activity: SSC Assembly; National Security Policy

As explained in FYI #112, our coverage is expanding to include science policy activities of AIP’s ten Member Societies. Below are descriptions of two APS activities -- one an event planned for next Monday, the second a letter sent last month.

SSC ASSEMBLY:

A Senate vote on the superconducting super collider should occur in the near future. The American Physical Society, Division of Particles and Fields, has scheduled a 90-minute “Science and Technology Assembly on Research at the SSC” on September 13, at George Washington University (Washington, D.C.) The program will include DOE Secretary O’Leary or her representative; Burton Richter, Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center; SSC Director Roy Schwitters; Leon Lederman; Steven Weinberg; and other speakers.

With an eye, no doubt, towards upcoming Senate debate, the Assembly will be centered around four themes, including “the impact of the SSC and fundamental research on education, industry, universities, and national laboratories.”

SSC opponents have been active this week as well. Today, Senators David Pryor (D-Arkansas) and Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona) and Representatives Jim Slattery (D-Kansas) and Sherwood Boehlert (R-New York) held a news conference on the Capitol grounds to garner votes to terminate the project.

Further information on the Assembly can be obtained from Michael Barnett at Barnett@LBL.gov or at 510-486-5650.

NATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION POLICY:

On August 19, APS President Donald N. Langenberg sent a two and one-half page letter to Steven Garfinkel, Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, commenting on a review of the national security classification policy. Portions of this letter follow:

“The security and economic health of the United States depend on the vitality of its science and technology, and nothing is more fundamental to that vitality than the process of open exchange between scientists. Thus, the Society applauds the much-needed and timely review of classification policy, although we are deeply concerned that the review process allows for insufficient public input.

“While there is clearly a need to restrict access to certain types of information, including specific technical achievements, attempts to classify scientific information are generally counterproductive and futile. In time, the scientists of other nations will uncover the same information, with or without violating our security controls. Classification then serves primarily to restrict the flow and the use of the information within our borders. At present, this is the case for much outstanding research on inertial confinement fusion now being pursued in DOE’s National Labs.

“Moreover, classification shields information from the normal scientific scrutiny and debate that are crucial to correct erroneous results and flawed technical concepts. Deprived of full technical criticism and encouraged by overly optimistic projections by their proponents, programs of highly questionable merit have consumed large amounts of our resources and energy.

“The Cold War has ended. We have an opportunity to rethink the classification system. Threats to national security remain, but they are very different than the prospect of an all-out nuclear exchange between superpowers. Revisions in the classification system must reflect this change.”