Department of Energy’s Reasoning on B-Factory Selection

As reported in FYI #136, the Department of Energy has decided to construct the B-factory at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. This decision implements an April 1992 recommendation of the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel to construct a B-factory, and follows a joint DOE and National Science Foundation study of competing SLAC and Cornell University proposals.

Competition for this facility was keen, but judging from the six page statement by Secretary Hazel O’Leary entitled, “Selection of the Preferred Site for the B-Factory,” the decision was not as close as some expected it might be. Last April, Office of Management and Budget Director Leon Panetta requested that DOE and NSF perform a technical review of the two proposals. The committee, chaired by Stanley Kowalski of MIT, evaluated, but did not rank, the two proposals. That ranking, and the final decision, was left to O’Leary.

In her October 4 statement, O’Leary cited three “risk factors” bearing on her selection: schedule risk, performance risk, and cost risk. In each of the three areas, O’Leary’s statement clearly favored the SLAC proposal. This proposal, which involves a collaboration with Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, was favored in the area of schedule risk, O’Leary said, because, “The SLAC proposal represents an extremely powerful combination of scientific and engineering talent which resides among three Department of Energy laboratories.” O’Leary expressed concern about Cornell’s ability to complete the project on time, her report stating, "...the Cornell proposal does not have an adequate safety margin for remaining on its planned schedule.”

O’Leary’s assessment of the comparative performance risk of the two proposals followed along this same track. After describing the “very stringent” performance requirements for the B-factory, she said that “the smaller tunnel at Cornell forces a technically riskier design,” which “will generate an unprecedented level of synchrotron radiation,” as well as requiring a never-attempted collision scheme.

DOE’s analysis of cost risk also favored SLAC. Although Cornell’s proposed budget was considerably smaller, DOE warned of schedule slippage on the order of six months to a year, “with an associated cost risk of $10 million to $20 million.” O’Leary said that Cornell’s cost contingency for unexpected problems was too low.

Other the heading of “Other Factors,” DOE found that SLAC “is well prepared to handle the approximately 300 physicists expected to utilize the B-factory.” Finally, the statement noted, “The unique work force which resides at SLAC has been established over a period of 30 years and represents a national repository of expertise that cannot be easily replicated. However, in a fashion unlike that of Cornell’s Laboratory of Nuclear Studies, the fate of SLAC and its personnel will be strongly impacted by this decision.”

Construction of the $170 million B-factory (plus an additional $60 million for a new particle detector) will begin this fall, with its completion scheduled by late 1998.