NASA and Space Station Both To Receive Redesign

On March 11, NASA announced that the White House has given Administrator Daniel Goldin the go-ahead to implement changes in the agency’s management structure. Goldin, a Bush Administration appointee, had announced most of the changes in October 1992, but the November election put his plans on hold until Clinton’s team could review them.

Goldin’s actions include splitting the Office of Space Science and Applications into two parts: Mission to Planet Earth, and the Office of Planetary Science and Astrophysics (see FYI#141, 1992 for details.) Goldin also announced new program offices for Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications, and for Advanced Concepts and Technology, both of which will report directly to the Administrator.

The changes go into effect as NASA begins the daunting task of once again redesigning Space Station Freedom. To achieve the goal of reducing the program’s operating costs by nearly one-half, the space agency is supposedly considering such options as giving up a permanently-manned capability; shortening the station’s lifespan; and inviting Russian participation. The redesign team is headed by Joseph Shea, a NASA veteran of the Apollo era who, under Goldin’s reorganization, will have oversight for all space station-related development activities. By June 1, the team is expected to present three options, in three different price ranges, for the Clinton Administration to choose from.

The requested redesign is seen by some as less-than-wholehearted support by President Clinton for a program that has repeatedly had to fight for its life. With enthusiastic backing from the Bush Administration, space station supporters had to fight off amendments for termination in the House and Senate in the last budget cycle. The program has already undergone several changes in design and scope and lived through several close calls in Congress. The most recent blow was an announcement by NASA early this year that program costs are projected to grow approximately $500 million beyond what was expected in the three-year period from fiscal years 1993 to 1995.

While the intention of another redesign may be to save money over the life of the space station, it is likely that, at least in the near term, costs will grow as a result of more changes to the program. At a March 2 hearing of the House Science Subcommittee on Space, witnesses testified that much of the ballooning cost was due to changes resulting from the last redesign, in 1991.

The hearing was chaired by Texan Ralph Hall, an avid space station supporter. Texas is home to the Johnson Space Center and an estimated 4,200 space station jobs. Hall invited other members of the Texas congressional delegation, including delegation dean Jack Brooks, to sit in on the hearing. Almost every member of the subcommittee turned out to say their piece about the need to control costs and streamline NASA management.

Arnold Aldrich, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Systems Development, attributed the cost growth to, among other things, “management challenges” resulting from the 1991 restructuring, and increased contractor rates due to declining aerospace industry business. Space Station Program Director Richard Kohrs detailed the actions planned to bring the program back within budget, including: reducing support contractors, consolidating some activities, deferring some hardware items and deleting others, using funds originally designated for the Assured Crew Return Vehicle, allowing a schedule slippage of four to six months, and possibly making changes to the assembly flight schedule. A final plan for trimming costs will be presented to Aldrich on April 1.

Kohrs admitted, when asked, that deferral of items would “save us in the near years,” but result in some additional costs when added back.

Several space station contractors also blamed much of the cost growth on changes to the original space station design. McDonnell Douglas Space Station Division Vice President Gale Schluter left the subcommittee with this advice: “I would urge the Congress and the Administration to make as few changes to our current design as possible. A lesson of the 1991 space station redesign is that a major redesign of the magnitude of [the] restructure, believed to save money based on simple and optimistic analyses in a quick turnaround mode, will invariably cost more as the new design details become apparent.”