DOD Quadrennial Review and Science and Technology
It has been about six weeks since The DOD Quadrennial Review (QDR) was released. Although there has been considerable discussion about another round of base closings, less mention has been made of QDR recommendations regarding science and technology. This FYI provides appropriate selections from the QDR, using as noted the report’s section headings. The full report (with recommendations on weapons systems) and other information can be found at the following site: http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/topstory/quad.html
WHAT IS THE QDR?: “The QDR is required by the Military Force Structure Review Act, which was included as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. The DOD designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America’s defense needs from 1997 to 2015.... The QDR is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.”
“WHERE WE ARE": "...it has become clear that we are failing to acquire the modern technology and systems that will be essential for our forces to successfully protect our national security interests in the future.”
“WHERE WE ARE GOING": “The information revolution is creating a Revolution in Military Affairs that will fundamentally change the way U.S. forces fight. We must exploit these and other technologies to dominate in battle.”
BUDGET OUTLOOK: DOD’s plans “are build on the premise that, barring a major crisis, national defense spending is likely to remain relatively constant in the future. ...Congress and the American people expect the Department to implement our defense program within a constrained resource environment.”
FUTURE STRATEGY: "...our future forces will be different in character. The programs we are undertaking now to exploit the potential of information technologies and leverage other advancing technological opportunities will transform warfighting.... In combat, we do not want a fair fight -- we want capabilities that give us a decisive advantage.”
“Achieving such capabilities is not an easy task and cannot be done in one leap. It is a step-by-step process involving the development of new technologies, investment in new platforms involving the development of new technologies, investment in new platforms and systems, new concepts, training and doctrine, and formation of new organizational structures.”
MISSILE DEFENSE: “National Missile Defense (NMD) remains a high priority. The Administration and Congress have agreed to keep this program on an accelerated research and development path aimed at creating the option to make a decision on deployment possibly as early as fiscal year 2000, if the threat warrants. The goal of the program is to be able to deploy an initial capability within three years after the decision on deployment is made. The QDR analysis concluded that the fiscal year 2000 target could not be met within the current program budget. We are directing additional funds to NMD, but even with additional funds, NMD will remain a program of high schedule and technical risk.”
REALIGNMENT: “Based on QDR analysis of our future needs versus our remaining infrastructure the Department will request authority for two additional rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and for the restructuring of laboratories, research, development, and test facilities. We will look for additional opportunities to outsource many functions and work with Congress to radically reengineer and deregulate the Department’s business practices.” The report later states: “Included in the reduction of infrastructure must also be our research and development and test facilities, laboratories, and ranges.” The report continues: “I [DOD Secretary William Cohen] have established a Defense Reform Task Force to review the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, DOD field activities, and the military departments and to look for ways we can consolidate functions, eliminate duplication of effort, and improve efficiency.... I have directed the Task Force to submit its report and findings to me by November 30, and I will act on its interim findings as appropriate.”
IMPLEMENTATION OF QDR RECOMMENDATIONS: “The Department will continue to consult with Congress on the QDR and implement the results through the submission of any needed changes in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 budget [now before Congress] and the development of a detailed budget for FY 1999 and revised program plans through 2003.”
“PREPARING NOW FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE": “Exploit the `Revolution in Military Affairs’” -- “investment in an array of science and technology programs as well as exploratory research to identify, develop, and test innovative operational concepts and force configurations that exploit new technologies.” Later, under “Insurance Policies,” the report states the following: “Among the necessary hedging steps are maintaining a broad research and development (R&D) effort; use of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations; contact with industries specializing in new technologies; and cooperation with allies who may develop new approaches to countering problems. An additional approach is to develop new capabilities through carefully tailored R&D and acquisition programs. For example, in missile defense, the United States has focused on R&D efforts that position us to deploy a credible national missile defense (NMD) against very limited attacks within three years of a deployment decision. Applying such an approach more broadly against new threats will require ensuring that we have the necessary intelligence capabilities for long-term strategic indications and warning, designing a process for validating such insurance requirements across the Department, and developing an insurance program profile and process that can be integrated into overall acquisition processes. Finally, R&D programs can be designed to adopt and adapt commercial technologies to military needs.”
“THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE” -- “THE MODERNIZATION IMPERATIVE: In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, the Department’s reductions in spending came disproportionately from reductions in procurement spending, a decision that reflected a prudent, calculated risk initiated by the Administration of President Bush and continued by this Administration. This approach was possible because large quantities of modern equipment had been purchased during the 1980s and force reductions had permitted the retirement of older ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles in the early 1990s. That drawdown is now over, the dividend from procurement reductions has been spent, the procurement holiday must end, and investment in modernization needs to rebound. Otherwise, the technological superiority of our forces -- and our ability to sustain their equipment stocks -- will erode over time.”
