
Image credit - DOE
Image credit - DOE
The Department of Energy implemented a new directive
The FBI and some congressional lawmakers have increasingly sought to discourage researchers from participating in such programs, alleging foreign governments use them to misappropriate U.S.-funded research and advance their rival strategic interests. Federal scrutiny of the programs has even led to arrests, including in cases that did not involve allegations of research misappropriation. Last month, a materials scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Turab Lookman, pleaded not guilty
While such arrests are uncommon, they have contributed to an increasingly tense atmosphere pervaded by concerns about overzealous
When DOE first announced
The directive defines a talent recruitment program as “any foreign-state-sponsored attempt to acquire U.S. scientific-funded research or technology through foreign government-run or funded recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States.” It further states,
Many, but not all, programs aim to incentivize the targeted individual to physically relocate to the foreign state. Of particular concern are those programs that allow for continued employment at U.S. research facilities or receipt of DOE research funds while concurrently receiving compensation from a foreign state.
In targeting the programs, the department is not only looking to stem misappropriation of research but also unreported work that benefits a foreign state. DOE Under Secretary for Science Paul Dabbar told FYI earlier this year that the department views participation in talent programs as presenting a “conflict of interest,” and that it had discovered individuals who had been offered “many millions of dollars.”
In addition to prohibiting participation in talent programs, DOE is also planning
Department officials discussed both the talent program and international collaboration policies at various advisory committee meetings this spring. Steve Binkley, then the acting director of the DOE Office of Science, told the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee in April that it would be “at least six months” before the department extended its talent program prohibition to university grantees. Speaking to the Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC) in March, Binkley said the collaboration restrictions policy is “focused primarily” on DOE’s labs and would initially focus on the same four countries as the talent programs policy. He said he expected a list of specific technologies of concern would be nailed down over the following “five or six months.”
Discussing domains on which specific restrictions are likely to apply, Binkley has mentioned particle accelerators, quantum information science, artificial intelligence, and biotechnologies such as CRISPR-Cas9. He told ASCAC that he anticipates the restrictions will specifically target only a “small, very, very precise, almost surgical list of technologies.” He also said a technology’s maturity level will not necessarily be the pivotal criterion for determining its inclusion in the risk matrix, noting that certain early-stage research could also be considered sensitive.
Putting the new policies in context, Binkley has emphasized the highly international character of the Office of Science’s work, noting its laboratories host some 30,000 foreign visitors every year, including about 10,000 from China. In pursuing collaborations, he said the office follows “guiding principles,” which include that research must be done for peaceful purposes and that researchers must be transparent and pursue work that provides mutual benefits. A fuller enumeration of these principles is available in his slide presentation
At the ASCAC meeting, Binkley noted that visitors have not always adhered to those principles, saying,
We’ve had instances where foreign individuals come into some of our facilities and do work that has been ultimately traced back to the nuclear weapons programs in their respective countries. We consider that to be completely unacceptable.
While DOE continues to develop its policies on participation in talent programs and international collaboration, other federal agencies are taking their own steps to increase scrutiny of talent programs and other forms of “foreign influence.”
The National Institutes of Health has launched investigations into cases where it believes researchers may be receiving undisclosed support from foreign entities, diverting intellectual property, or inappropriately sharing grant applications. NIH Deputy Director Lawrence Tabak told
These inquiries have already led the MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston to investigate
The Department of Defense would have implemented strict restrictions on talent program participation under a proposal
National Science Foundation Director France Córdova recently told the House Science Committee
The National Science and Technology Council, an interagency coordinating body, recently established